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FUNDING CONDITIONS AND FREE SPEECH FOR
HIV/AIDS NGOS: HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER
CANNOT ALWAYS CALL THE TUNE
Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping*
The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act pledges billions of dollars to fund NGOs combating the
HIV/AIDS epidemic but requires recipients to adopt a policy explicitly
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. A possible recipient NGO
confronts a tough decision: adopt an affirmative statement against
prostitution and sex trafficking to accept the funds, alienating a vital
partner in its efforts to eradicate HIV/AIDS; or deny the funds to speak its
own message, though without the benefit of government assistance.
Courts are split on whether the Leadership Act’s policy requirement
places an unconstitutional condition on federal funds that requires grant
recipients to surrender their First Amendment right to freedom of speech by
compelling speech and impermissibly discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint. This Note addresses the circuit split that has resulted from
differing conceptions of what constitutes compelled speech, what conditions
act as a penalty, and what conditions suppress alternate viewpoints. To
resolve this split, this Note adopts the framework of analysis used by
dissenting Judge Chester Straub in the Second Circuit and applies his
framework to assert that the Leadership Act’s policy requirement
unconstitutionally denies NGOs the ability to express alternate messages
with nonfederal funds.
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INTRODUCTION
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) have greatly impacted society, both as a
disease and as a source of stigma and discrimination. In 2009 alone,
approximately 1.8 million adults and children died of HIV/AIDS.1 As of
2010, about 33.3 million are infected globally,2 including millions of
mothers3 and children.4 While epidemic patterns vary, drug use and
prostitution both continue to be high risk behaviors that exacerbate the
global HIV epidemic.5
People infected with HIV continue to be stigmatized, discriminated
against, and treated unfairly. The U.N. AIDS program reports that 78
1. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, Global Report: UNAIDS Report
on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.unaids.org/
globalreport/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_full_en.pdf.
2. Id. at 21, 23 tbl 2.2.
3. In 2009, approximately 370,000 children were born to mothers infected with HIV.
Id. at 78.
4. As of 2009, 3.4 million children were living with HIV. Id. at 23, 24 fig. 2.5. Sixteen
million children have been orphaned by infected parents. Id.
5. Id. at 224. This Note uses the word “prostitute” unenthusiastically, because that
word implies a situation of choice and agency involved for these women, which statistics
and evidence suggest is not the case. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993) (describing the victimization of women in
prostitution); Nicole Franck Masenior & Chris Beyrer, The US Anti-prostitution Pledge:
First Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities, 4 PLOS MED. 1158, 1159 (2007)
(briefly describing the controversy over using the term “prostitution”); Julie Bindel,
Eradicate the Oldest Oppression, GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2006, at 28 (detailing the oppressive
aspects the prostitution has on women). Instead, words like “the prostituted” or “sex
worker” will hopefully become more popular. However, in an effort to be faithful to the
wording of the statute at issue, this Note will utilize the word “prostitution.”
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countries—46 percent of reporting countries—acknowledged the existence
of laws, policies, and regulations that obstructed access to effective HIV
prevention, treatment, care, and support for population groups at higher risk
and other vulnerable population groups.6 Likewise, only 46 percent of 171
reporting countries budget HIV programs for women;7 more than 100
countries continue to criminalize some form of sex work.8 The increasing
trend of laws criminalizing the transmission of HIV or the failure to
disclose one’s HIV status does not support a safe environment for voluntary
disclosure either.9 Even so, 51 countries, territories, and entities impose
some form of restriction on the entry, stay, and residence of people living
with HIV.10
With the HIV/AIDS epidemic continuing to affect millions, the United
States, as the world leader in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic,11 took
action in 2003 by passing the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act12 (Leadership Act). The Leadership Act
pledged billions of dollars to fight against HIV/AIDS, assisting nonprofits,
foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around
the world.13 The Leadership Act has one caveat or policy requirement:
according to section 7631(f), the government would only disburse funds to
organizations that have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking.”14
Despite the government’s goodwill, some NGOs conducting HIV/AIDS
prevention and treatment programs have challenged the Policy
Requirement’s constitutionality. Courts disagree on whether the Policy
6. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 1, at 123.
7. Id. at 134.
8. Id. at 126.
9. Id. at 128.
10. Id. at 127 fig. 5.2.
11. See HIV/ AIDS, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/hivaids
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (finding that USAID has been at the forefront of the global AIDs
crisis since 1986, providing lifesaving treatment to more than 3.9 million people, counseling
for more than 40 million people, care for 9.8 million pregnant women, including mother-tochild prevention support for 660,000 HIV-infected mothers); see also Remarks on Signing
the United States Leadership Act Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003, 1 PUB. PAPERS 541 (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter Presidential Remarks], available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/74868.htm.
12. Pub. L. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011)). Congress later extended funding until 2013. See United States Global
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 401(a), 122 Stat. 2918, 2966 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 7601 (Supp V. 2011)).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 7601.
14. This Note refers to this caveat as the “Policy Requirement.” Id. § 7631(f); see infra
Part I.B.2. While the Act juxtaposes sex trafficking and prostitution because both perpetuate
an oppressive sex industry, sex trafficking and prostitution each involve different levels of
agency, coercion, and slavery. See Kate Butcher, Confusion Between Prostitution and Sex
Trafficking, 361 LANCET 1983, 1983 (2003); Masenior & Beyrer, supra note 5, at 1159
(finding that “many organizations disagree with the Act’s equation of all forms of
prostitution with sex trafficking”).
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Requirement requires recipient NGOs to surrender their First Amendment
free speech rights. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Policy Requirement in
2007, finding that the Leadership Act did not coerce or force any recipient
to unwillingly espouse the government’s message.15 The Second Circuit
disagreed, finding that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally
conditioned the receipt of federal funds by failing to leave open alternative
channels of expression and compelling recipient organizations to speak the
government’s message.16
This Note explores the constitutionality of the Leadership Act’s Policy
Requirement. Like the fabled Pied Piper of Hamelin who charmed a town’s
rats away in return for a fee,17 is an NGO that accepts government funds
obligated to play the government’s tune? Despite Congress’s broad powers
under the Spending Clause,18 does a funding condition that imposes an
affirmative speech requirement infringe on constitutionally protected free
speech? This Note clarifies and explains how the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applies to the Policy Requirement. Part I explains the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions of free speech and outlines the
Leadership Act’s purpose, text, and effects. Part II analyzes the different
standards of review and holdings that form the current split between the
Second and D.C. Circuits over whether the Leadership Act’s Policy
Requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a recipient’s free speech. Part
III argues that Judge Chester Straub’s dissent in the Second Circuit had the
best framework for analyzing unconstitutional conditions cases, but applied
the framework to reach an incorrect conclusion. Part III concludes that the
Policy Requirement should be deemed unconstitutional for failing to
provide an adequate alternate channel for NGOs wishing to refrain from
speaking an antiprostitution message, and by restricting the recipient’s Free
Speech outside of the scope of the recipient’s participation in the federallyfunded program.
I. U.S. FOREIGN AID, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND
THE LEADERSHIP ACT
Part I of this Note explores the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
its application to the Leadership Act. Part I.A traces the evolution of the
unconstitutional conditions through the courts and proposes a general
framework for understanding conditional government subsidies on free
speech. Part I.B introduces funding conditions for foreign aid and gives a
brief account of the Leadership Act’s purpose, text, and effects.
15. See DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
16. See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (Alliance IV),
651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
17. ROBERT BROWNING, THE PIED PIPER OF HAMELIN (1888), available at
http://www.indiana.edu/~librcsd/etext/piper/text.html.
18. See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
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A. Understanding Unconstitutional Conditions on the Right to Free
Speech: History and Current Analysis
The Spending Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”19 While
this constitutional provision has consistently been found to give Congress
the power to provide subsidies in order to advance its policy goals,20 the
spending power does not give Congress absolute discretion to condition
federal funds.21 When the government does not directly regulate an
activity, but only implicates those interests through conditions on federal
spending, a different framework, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine addresses the
applies.22
constitutionality of conditions placed on the receipt of federal funds that
infringe on the recipient’s constitutional rights.23 Though the doctrine has

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
20. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (citing Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980), Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974), Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947), and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937)). For the purposes of this Note, government subsidies can be benefits of any type,
including cash, grants, tax exemptions, in-kind goods or services, or the permission to use
government facilities for a lower cost.
21. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S.
47, 59 (2006) (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003));
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S.
583, 593–94 (1926) (finding that “the power of the state . . . is not unlimited”).
22. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 679–80 (1992); Richard
A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–7 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV 1293, 1293–95 (1984); Thomas W.
Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L.
REV. 859, 859–60 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1421 (1989).
23. Lynn Baker argues that the government creates subsidies with two types of
conditions: (1) conditions that present a choice for the recipient between “complying with
the attached condition and receiving the benefit, or not complying and foregoing receipt of
the benefit”; and (2) “conditions that automatically disqualify persons who possess some
immutable characteristic.” Lynn A. Baker, The Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1990). This Note will not
address the second type of condition, which usually concerns a denial of equal protection
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; instead, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
generally only concerns those conditions on government subsidies that present an individual
with an apparent choice.
For more conditional allocations based on immutable
characteristics that violate the Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Rights, see Gary
Feinerman, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of Substantive Rights and Equal
Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1991).
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been criticized,24 some scholars remain optimistic about the use of
conditional government subsidies.25
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
checking government conditional power,26 it has provided four constraints
on conditional government subsidies. The first constraint, derived from the
language of the Constitution, provides that the spending power must be in
pursuit of “the general welfare.”27 Courts, however, have deferred to
congressional judgment to make that conclusion.28 The second constraint
requires Congress to unambiguously and clearly denote the condition.29
This constraint enables the recipient to make an informed free choice, aware
of the decision’s consequences.30 Similar to the first, however, courts have
found that government subsidies easily comply with this requirement.31
Third, conditions on federal grants must have a rational relationship to the
federal interest at stake.32 While this rational relationship test could
theoretically rein in conditional subsidies by requiring a close nexus
between the monies and the enumerated interest, courts have applied this
test with similar deference to the legislature, requiring only a minimal
showing of a rational relationship.33 In South Dakota v. Dole,34 the Court
admitted that the third “relatedness” constraint had never been defined, but
found that receiving federal highway funds was sufficiently related to the
condition that the legal drinking age be twenty-one years old.
24. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is An
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REV. 593 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000)
(arguing that conditional subsidies can be used to change societal norms and values); Robert
C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (analyzing how a democratic
state can achieve its goals through subsidizing speech).
26. See Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926).
27. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65 (1936); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28. See e.g., Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297 U.S. at 65. The Court has even
questioned whether this restriction is even judicially enforceable given the level of deference
given to Congress. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (citing Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976)).
29. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
32. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(finding that federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable
conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”).
33. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (finding that “conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs’” (quoting Massachusetts, 485 U.S. at 461 (1971))); Lawrence Cnty v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96
(1976). The Supreme Court has likewise required a close nexus between the purpose of a
government benefit and the condition for takings. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
34. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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Consequently, the Court declined to “address whether conditions less
directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside
the bounds of the spending power.”35 Despite Justice O’Connor’s finding
that the majority had misapplied the relatedness test,36 lower courts have
found this rational-relation test to be toothless.37
Because the other requirements have become mostly irrelevant, the
Constitution provides the main limitation on conditional subsidies.38 Any
government exchange of some benefit, usually a grant or a tax exemption
for the waiver of any part of a constitutional right, triggers the doctrine.39
This includes a subsidy conditioned on any requirement that infringes on
the recipient’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.40 The
unconstitutional conditions framework is irrelevant, however, when the
freedom of speech is merely implicated or affected; the condition must
cause a violation of the underlying First Amendment right.41 Thus, the
purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to determine when a
subsidy condition infringes on a recipient’s First Amendment rights.42
When the condition does not violate a right, then no unconstitutional
35. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09 n.3.
36. Id. at 213–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that “establishment of a minimum
drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose”).
37. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998)
(finding that a Child Enforcement Program condition had a “sufficient relationship to the
purpose of the federal funding so as to pass constitutional muster” without further
analysis); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(providing only limited analysis of the relatedness prong by saying “[t]he Court finds that
[the statutory provisions at issue] easily satisfy this requirement, and Defendant does not
argue otherwise”); see also Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole:
Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How A Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 463 (2003) (finding that none of the restrictions
have much “bite”). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579
(2012) (declining to extend the Dole framework, though noting its “permissive reading”
when considering conditional subsidies).
38. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
333 n.34 (1968). While other amendments can constrain government subsidies as well, this
Note will focus exclusively on conditions that infringe on the freedom of speech in the First
Amendment. For more on other types of unconstitutional conditions, see Baker, supra note
23, at 1187 (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with reference to “public
assistance” and the general welfare); William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
243 (1989); Michael W. McConnel, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Unrecognized
Implications of the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989).
39. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1421–22.
40. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (finding that the government
“may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”); see also FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59
(2006) (recognizing Congress’s limited ability to condition funds that limit freedom of
speech).
41. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 244 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d
127 (2d Cir. 2012); FAIR, 547 U.S. at 59–60 (not addressing the unconstitutional conditions
issue because no underlying constitutional violation would occur even under a direct
restriction).
42. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 244 (quoting FAIR, 547 U.S. at 59).
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conditions problem arises and the conditional subsidy is presumed
constitutional.43 When the condition does violate the right, then the
condition is presumed unconstitutional.44
The unconstitutional doctrine case law for subsidies related to speech has
many different justifications and lines of reasoning. The rest of Part I.A
will help to clarify those cases. First, it describes some of the First
Amendment doctrine relevant when considering whether a conditional
subsidy infringes on the underlying First Amendment right and explains
how the viewpoint-based distinction has become a relevant factor to the
analysis. Next it considers those conditional subsidy cases that have
examined whether the condition acts as a coercive penalty. Finally it
discusses those subsidy cases that have based their holding on whether the
speech can be considered government speech.
1. The Viewpoint Discrimination-Based Analysis of Conditional Subsidies
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech.”45 First Amendment rights have been found to
include both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking.46 The Supreme Court has even found that compelled speech
should be treated no differently than compelled silence.47 Regardless of its
distinction, the right to communicate one’s views has never been absolute;
restraints on free expression may be “permitted for appropriate reasons.”48

43. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (finding that the constitutional limits of the spending
power are less demanding when the regulation is indirect); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (finding that heightened scrutiny was not
warranted for all conditions that “‘affect[] First Amendment rights’” (quoting Taxation With
Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982))); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 518 (1958) (noting that the denial of a tax exemption could infringe on free speech).
44. While the Supreme Court has never applied a heightened standard, the standard
applied depends on the substantive right being infringed upon. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. Speech limitations are scrutinized differently depending on a number of
different factors under the First Amendment. See infra Part I.A.1.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that the First
Amendment protects the right to speak and the “right to refrain from speaking at all”). The
Supreme Court has intimated that the government may even be held to a higher standard
when restricting the right to refrain from speaking. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”). Both Wooley
and Barnette dealt with state laws that punished those from refraining to speak. See Wooley,
430 U.S. at 709; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633, 642 (declaring unconstitutional a state law
requiring children to salute the flag).
47. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (finding the
distinction between compelled speech and compelled silence “without constitutional
significance”).
48. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). Hugo Black famously disagreed, though
the Supreme Court never accepted his view. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 880 (1960) (finding that the plain language of the Constitution shows
that the First Amendment did not contain “any qualifications”).
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a. The Government’s Content-Neutrality Mandate
Two distinctions have been critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis of
government restrictions on freedom of speech. First, the Supreme Court
has differentiated between content-based and content-neutral restrictions.
Content-based restrictions inhibit expression based on its message, whereas
content-neutral restrictions apply to all speech regardless of viewpoint.49
Government content-based restrictions are consequently presumed
invalid,50 and must pass strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral restrictions
need only pass intermediate scrutiny.51
When the government seeks to prohibit speech directly, the First
Amendment demands neutrality toward content52 and viewpoint53 because
government regulation “may not favor one speaker over another.”54
Viewpoint restrictions are presumed unconstitutional because they “raise[]
the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace”55 or “indoctrinate the citizenry.”56 Any
attempt by the government “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas” is
presumptively beyond the power of the government to curtail.57

49. Viewpoint discrimination is defined as speech regulation based on “the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker,” and as “an egregious form
of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
50. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.”); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
640–41 (1994). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 932–41 (3d ed. 2006).
51. The strict scrutiny test finds constitutional only those laws that are narrowly tailored
to a substantial government interest. The less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard
upholds only laws that are substantially related to an important government interest. The
rational basis standard finds constitutional those laws that are rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. For more on standards of review for First Amendment
claims, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 933–41 (describing content-neutrality, strict
scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny).
52. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message . . . or its content.”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 680–81;
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 105–10 (1996).
53. See, e.g., City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)
(“[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at 680–81.
54. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828.
55. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
56. Cole, supra note 22, at 681.
57. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective
Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 503
(2000).
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b. Public Forum Doctrine
The Court has also drawn distinctions based on the places available for
the speech.58 Because speech requires a place to be heard, the Court has
generally distinguished between two types of government property where
speech can take place: public and nonpublic forums.59 While public
forums were traditionally held to be only streets and sidewalks used for
public communication and assembly,60 the Court now treats all publicly
owned property basically the same.61 Nonpublic forums are those
government properties that can be closed to all speech activities.62
While the Court has never articulated clear criteria for determining
whether a forum is public or nonpublic, three factors have been particularly
salient: whether the particular place is traditionally available for speech,63
the extent to which speech is incompatible with the usual functioning of the
place,64 and whether the place’s primary purpose is for speech.65 Thus, the
basic rule is that a forum is public if the speech occurs at the customary
time and manner of expression at that location.66
58. Jess Alderman, Words to Live By: Public Health, the First Amendment, and
Government Speech, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 161, 166–68 (2009).
59. For more on publicly owned property for speech purposes and under what
circumstances it can be restricted, see Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum
Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora
Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233.
60. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (finding that public
forums are places “held in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”).
61. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983)
(discussing the different categories of places accessible for speech purposes). While an
additional distinction exists between public forums and designated or limited public forums,
if the government chooses to allow speech in such a place, all the rules for public forums
apply equally and the distinction becomes mostly irrelevant. See e.g., Good News Club v.
Milford Centr. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (finding a content-based restriction
impermissible when both parties had created a “limited public forum” in a school); see also
Kaplan v. Cnty. of L.A., 894 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that limited public
forums are treated as a public forum for First Amendment purposes); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 50, at 1137–39.
62. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1139–43; cf. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(holding that the government could prohibit speech in the areas outside prisons and jails
because it was not a public forum).
63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1143–44; cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (plurality opinion) (focusing not on whether sidewalks were generally
available for free speech, but whether sidewalks were available on U.S. Post Office
property).
64. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1143 (“The greater the incompatibility, the more
likely that the Court will find the place to be a nonpublic forum.”); cf., Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (describing how the government cannot control private
speech in a medium of expression to “distort its usual functioning”).
65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, at 1144; cf. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (finding post
office property was not a public forum because it had not been dedicated to speech
activities); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(finding that expression is not the primary purpose of airports).
66. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (finding a “flexible approach” to be
more appropriate); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (finding that
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Consequently, any speech in a public forum is subject to the contentneutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions provided to all regulated
speech.67 In any public forum, the government can only regulate speech
that reasonably limits disruption to the public space.68 Reasonable
restrictions must be (1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest (i.e., pass strict scrutiny); and (3) leave open
alternative channels for communication.69 The constitutionality of these socalled “time, place, and manner” restrictions is mostly contextual.70 While
these restrictions must be narrowly tailored, they do not necessarily have to
use the least restrictive alternative.71
2. The Analysis of Government Subsidies That Hinge on Whether the
Condition Coerces or Penalizes
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the “government
may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether.”72 This conception of the doctrine has caused courts and
commentators to consider whether the government uses its conditional
subsidy power to coerce recipients to engage in unconstitutional activities.73

“[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”); see also Stone, supra note 59,
at 251–52.
67. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48.
68. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
69. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647.
70. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (“The nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal
activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’”
(quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027,
1042 (1969)); Alderman, supra note 58, at 166; Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969).
71. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[I]t may satisfy the tailoring
requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the
statutory goal.”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (finding that the
regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so”).
72. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1415. Sullivan explains: “Unconstitutional conditions
problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or
forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from government
interference.” Id. at 1421–22.
73. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (finding a subsidy to be a
“relatively mild encouragement” rather than “federal coercion”); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (considering whether the conditional subsidy passed the
point where “pressure turns into compulsion”); Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1428–41
(“Directly and through metaphors of duress or penalty, the Court has repeatedly suggested
that the problem with unconstitutional conditions is their coercive effect.”).

2012]

FUNDING CONDITIONS AND FREE SPEECH

1109

a. Speiser v. Randall
Speiser v. Randall74 was one of the first articulations that a conditional
government subsidy cannot act as a coercive penalty.75 In Speiser, the State
of California required veterans to sign a loyalty oath stating that they did
not advocate the violent overthrow of the government in exchange for a
property exemption.76 The Court found that the condition penalized the
recipients by coercing them to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech.77 Though the tax exemption was a “privilege,” the government
could not deny the tax exemption without unconstitutionally infringing on
speech.78 Because the conditional subsidy acted as a coercive penalty, the
statute violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.79
b. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,80 the Court
upheld a federal statute providing that contributions to an organization are
tax deductible only if that organization either (1) does not use a substantial
portion of their contributions for lobbying or (2) is a veterans’
organization.81 Even though the First Amendment protects lobbying
activities,82 the Court found that Congress was not required to subsidize
lobbying efforts.83
Two important factors were critical to the Court’s holding: Congress
denied Taxation With Representation In Washington (TWR) neither the
right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity
nor any independent benefit.84 Even under a least-restrictive means
analysis, these organizations remained free to receive tax-deductible
contributions to support non-lobbying activities through their organizational
The veterans’ organizations, which could use their
affiliates.85
contributions for lobbying, were tax exempt regardless of their speech’s
74. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
75. Id. at 518 (“To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the
State were to fine them for this speech.”) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 515.
77. Id. at 519 (“[T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech
necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
speech. The denial is ‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”) (citation
omitted).
78. See id. at 518 (finding that the fact that “a tax exemption is a ‘privilege’ or ‘bounty’”
does not mean that “its denial may not infringe speech”).
79. Id. at 520–29.
80. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
81. Id. at 543.
82. See E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–
38 (1961).
83. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
84. Id. at 545–46.
85. Id. at 545; see id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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content.86 Congress was free to make policy choices unless those choices
infringe on free speech by suppressing a certain viewpoint.87 The Regan
Court emphasized that Congress had not violated the First Amendment by
making a policy choice to fund one activity over another.88 Subsidies, the
Court found, are simply “a matter of grace” that Congress has the power to
grant or deny as a matter of democratic vote.89 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun similarly found that the affiliate structure alleviated any
problems to the conditional subsidy by allowing nonprofits to speak without
losing the tax benefits.90 This contrast between permissible nonsubsidies
and impermissible penalties is not limited to speech, but is a common
feature of the Supreme Court’s protection of individual liberties from
government overreaching.91
c. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California
The Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California92
struck down a conditional subsidy that penalized protected speech by
invalidating a law withholding federal funds from public radio and
television stations that engaged in “editorial broadcasts.”93 In contrast with
the tax provisions upheld in Regan, the Court emphasized that the
government had failed to provide an alternative route for expression:
broadcast stations could not limit the speech conducted with federal funds
while also pursuing their protected speech funded by nonfederal
donations.94 Congress need not support all forms of speech, but it cannot
withdraw funding merely because the recipient uses other nonfederal funds
to engage in disliked speech, even if federal funding is only a small
minority of the total contributions.95

86. Id. at 545 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 549 (noting that Congress’s freedom to “select[] . . . particular entities or
persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse ‘is obviously a matter of policy and discretion
not open to judicial review’” (quoting United States v. Reality Co., 163 U.S. 427, 444
(1896)).
88. Id. at 546 (finding that Congress “ha[d] not infringed any First Amendment rights
. . . [but] ha[d] simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying”).
89. Id. at 549 (quoting Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
90. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 n.8 (1977) (finding that a penalty analysis would lead to strict scrutiny of the conditional
subsidy for welfare benefits to women). At least one court placed emphasis on whether the
funding program has placed any obstacle in the way of the recipient exercising its
constitutional right. See DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275,
289 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that an agency program was constitutional because it placed no
obstacles in the way of the plaintiff’s funding of abortions).
92. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
93. Id. at 400–01.
94. Id. at 400.
95. Id. (finding that Congress had not merely refused to subsidize editorializing by
public broadcasting stations, but rather it had caused a “station that receives only 1% of its
overall income from [federal] grants [to be] barred absolutely from all editorializing”).
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Because the condition restricted the station’s speech outside of the scope
of the recipient’s participation in the government program, the Court found
the conditional subsidy unconstitutional.96 The Court did, however,
explicitly note that Congress could have maintained the restriction if it had
also allowed broadcast stations to establish affiliate organizations to
editorialize with nonfederal money.97
d. Rust v. Sullivan
Rust v. Sullivan98 similarly distinguished between restricting the
recipient’s speech funded by the government and restricting all of the
recipient’s speech.99 In Rust, a Title X100 program provided grants to
healthcare organizations on the condition that no money would be used on
abortion-related advocacy.101 The regulations also required grant recipients
to keep federally-funded activities financially and physically separate from
prohibited abortion activities.102 The funds were tied exclusively to how
the recipient used Title X money, not how the recipient used its own nonTitle X funds.103
Echoing Regan and League of Women Voters, the Rust Court upheld the
regulations, finding that the subsidy condition did not restrict the recipient’s
First Amendment speech outside of the scope of the government
program.104 The Rust Court similarly found that Congress had not denied
any recipient its constitutional right to engage in pro-abortion related
speech or activism by refusing to fund abortion-related activities and by
requiring some institutional separation and integrity.105

96. Id. (“The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all
noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly
private funds to finance its editorial activity.”).
97. Id.
98. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
99. See id. at 197.
100. The Title X Family Planning Program, enacted under President Richard Nixon in
1970 as part of the Public Health Service Act, is the only federal grant program solely
dedicated to family planning and reproductive health services for low-income and uninsured
patients. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300–300a-8.
101. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. Specifically, the condition barred grant-receiving programs
from providing abortion counseling, referring pregnant women to abortion providers,
lobbying for legislation, or otherwise advocating for measures that would increase the
availability of abortion. See id. at 196.
102. Id. at 180–81.
103. Id. at 198–99.
104. Id. at 196 (“The Secretary’s regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up
abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate
and distinct from Title X activities.”) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 198.
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e. United States v. American Library Association
The latest chapter in this line of conditional cases was United States v.
American Library Association Inc.,106 where the Supreme Court upheld a
law that conditioned public library funding on the installation of filter
software to block access to inappropriate material on library computers.107
The American Library Court echoed Rust, Regan, and League of Women
Voters, and found that a mere refusal to fund a protected activity is not a
The Supreme Court continued its trend of upholding
penalty.108
government subsidies because the recipient could freely accept the
conditional subsidy or find alternate means of funding.109 If adequate
alternative channels for protected expression are available, Congress can
conditionally restrict the First Amendment rights of the recipients without
the restriction being considered a coercive penalty.110
While the Court has stressed the availability of alternate independent
means of funding, seldom has the Court inquired into whether the
independent alternate means of funding actually exists. In American
Library, for example, the Court found that the program did not deny the
libraries their right to provide unfiltered internet access,111 but failed to
consider that no alternate means of funding actually existed. The League of
Women Voters Court, however, found that because the station received only
one percent of its funds from nonfederal sources, the refusal to subsidize
editorializing amounted to a penalty because effectively no other source of
funding existed.112 A recipient program’s reliance on federal funding may
be yet another variable in the calculus to be explored further in the future.

106. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
107. Id. at 200–01, 214.
108. See id. at 200–01.
109. See id. at 212 (“To the extent that libraries wish to offer unfiltered access, they are
free to do so without federal assistance.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5 (“[S]ubsidies are just
that, subsidies. The recipient is in no way compelled to operate a Title X project; to avoid the
force of the regulations, it can simply decline the subsidy.” (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984))); cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010) (finding that plaintiffs were not
coerced to modify its membership policies in order to receive state funding); Guardians
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 596 (1983) (finding that the receipt of
conditional federal funding “is a consensual matter: the State or other grantee weighs the
benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and agreeing to comply with the conditions
attached to their receipt”).
110. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212 (finding that Congress’s decision not to
subsidize the activity could not be considered a penalty); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
164 F.3d 757, 766 (1999) (“Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of recipients
of government benefits”); see also Brooklyn Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d
219, 231 (2006).
111. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 212.
112. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984).
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3. The Analysis of Conditional Subsidies Based on
Government Speech and Public Forums
The government speech doctrine, however, considers what messages the
government can support either by communicating its own message or
subsidizing speech for another. The First Amendment and public forum
doctrine recognize that the government must permit some speech on public
property without content discrimination, but can restrict other property from
public speech use altogether.113 Because any attempt by the government to
suppress an unpopular idea is considered unconstitutional,114 the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized maintaining viewpoint neutrality.115
While the Speiser and Regan Courts followed this logic by finding
conditional subsidies to be unconstitutional if based on viewpoint
discrimination,116 they never used the language of the government being
able to control the message it seeks to convey or support.
a. Rust v. Sullivan
Rust v. Sullivan was the seminal case establishing the government speech
doctrine. In addition to considering whether the conditional subsidy was
coercive,117 the Court considered whether the Title X regulations on family
planning grants were unconstitutionally viewpoint-based.118 Like Regan,
the Court found no viewpoint discrimination because the government can
choose to encourage certain activities by funding one program without also
funding an alternate program dealing with the problem in another way.119

113. See supra Part I.A.1.b.
114. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“[I]deologically driven attempts to
suppress a particular point of view are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other
contexts.”); Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983).
115. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984)
(stating that “viewpoint neutrality. . . . underlies the First Amendment”); Police Dep’t of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[The] government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (invalidating a school’s compulsory flag
salute as a government attempt to impose a favored viewpoint). For more on viewpoint
discrimination, see Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99,
105–10 (1996), and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46
(1987).
116. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (finding conditional subsidies
unconstitutional if aimed at the “suppression of dangerous ideas”); Regan, 461 U.S. at 548
(same).
117. See infra Part I.A.2.d.
118. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991).
119. Id. at 193 (finding that the government had “merely chosen to fund one activity to
the exclusion of the other”).
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Conditional encouragement of an activity prompts an entirely different
analysis from direct state regulation.120
Because the government must choose what messages, programs, and
projects to fund, certain programs will always be chosen and funded to the
exclusion of others based on the viewpoints expressed. Though the
government did make a policy choice in Rust that discriminated by
viewpoint,121 making that viewpoint-based policy choice was permissible
because its purpose was not to suppress an unpopular idea.122 The
government must make policy choices about what activities and services to
subsidize, though those choices may be based on aesthetic, political, or
moral viewpoints.123 Instead, the government was ensuring that the grantee
engaged in activities within the funded project’s scope.124 Thus, when the
government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is entitled
to define the limits of that program’s speech.125

120. Id. (“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy.”).
121. See, e.g., id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The regulations are also clearly
viewpoint based.”); Robert C. Post, supra note 25, at 170 (“The [Rust] regulations plainly
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”).
122. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (finding that
viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in situations like in Rust where private
speakers are used as agents to convey a government-funded program or message); Alliance
IV, 651 F.3d 218, 250 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 678
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[The Rust Court’s explanation] may have been another way of
stating the conclusion that the government had not impermissibly discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint.”). But see Post, supra note 25, at 170 (finding that Rust discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint); Ann Brewster Weeks, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion
Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1661 (1992) (condemning Rust
for viewpoint discrimination). The fine line between permissible and impermissible
viewpoint discrimination for conditional subsidies hinges on whether the viewpoint being
suppressed is based on a desire to suppress an unpopular idea or a desire to make an
effective policy choice. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977) (finding that the state
was “not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor normal
childbirth”); DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (finding that deciding not to fund abortion-related activities in NGOs “simply
represents a policy choice, not an invidious discrimination”); see also Cole, supra note 22, at
730 n.217 (finding that conditional funding underscores that “neutrality can be imposed in
varying degrees”).
123. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 613 (discussing the government dilemma of making
policy choices while still maintaining viewpoint neutrality). The desire to present a unified
government message can become even stronger when the issue involves foreign rather than
domestic affairs. See DKT Mem’l Fund, 887 F.2d at 290 (finding that the government policy
choices in foreign affairs is consistent with settled precedent and to hold otherwise would
“work much mischief”); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (citing Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853)).
124. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. The Rust Court even used a provocative hypothetical to
illustrate this point. Id. (finding that if Congress established “the National Endowment for
Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism”).
125. Id.
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The Rust Court did, however, find that government subsidy conditions
could not always justify content- or viewpoint-based restrictions.126 The
difference between permissible and impermissible restrictions depended on
whether the government had created a public forum.127 The government’s
ability to refuse to grant a speaker access to a forum does not allow the
government to violate its neutrality mandate.128 If the government creates a
public forum, certain privileged relationships may be inherently protected
regardless of government subsidies, but abortion-related speech is not one
of them.129
b. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia
The Court applied Rust’s viewpoint discrimination analysis to a
government subsidy given to public university student groups in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,130 where a
student organization was denied funding when it wanted to publish a
Because the
newspaper that advocated Christian viewpoints.131
government had created a “metaphysical” public forum for student speech
by funding student groups, the State could not exclude speech based on
viewpoint.132 If the government does use private speakers to convey its
own message, the government can make viewpoint-based decisions and
“may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”133 Because the University of
Virginia offered funds to student groups to encourage speech from private
speakers and intended to facilitate the speech of those private speakers

126. Id.
127. Id. at 200 (“[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental
to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is
restricted.” (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603,
605–06 (1967))).
128. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (finding that the government cannot discriminate once it has created a
forum for speech); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (holding that once the government “has expressly dedicated [a particular
forum] to speech activity,” it cannot exclude speakers based upon the content of their
speech); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1985) (same
holding); Cole, supra note 22, at 692.
129. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194–95; see Cole, supra note 22, at 692 (finding that the Rust
Court “acknowledged that the doctor-patient relationship might deserve similar first
amendment protection ‘even when subsidized by the government,’” but found that the Title
X program was not significantly affected) (citation omitted).
130. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
131. Id. at 823–28.
132. Id. at 829–30. Interestingly, the Court distinguished Rosenberger from Rust because
in Rust the government had used private speakers to transmit its own message for its funded
program rather than create a forum for private speech. See id. at 833.
133. Id. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200).
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through funding, the Court found that the University had created a public
forum and could not “silence the expression of selected viewpoints.”134
c. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
The Court further elaborated on the limitations of the public forum
doctrine in the context of government subsidies in National Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley.135 In Finley, Congress had conditioned federal grants to
artists upon consideration of “general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”136 The Court found
that the conditional funding did not amount to impermissible viewpoint
discrimination because the government did not “indiscriminately
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers’” but instead
mandated a program with viewpoint-based “esthetic judgments.”137
d. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,138 the Court struck down a
conditional subsidy, where the government conditioned the receipt of legal
assistance funds on a waiver prohibiting any funded assistance to challenge
existing welfare laws.139 The Court distinguished the case from Rust
because the private speech was expressly not intended to speak a
government message.140 The Title X programs in Rust neither created a
public forum nor distorted the privileged doctor-patient relationship,141
whereas in Velazquez the regulation had tainted the attorney’s role by
limiting the ability to challenge potentially illegal welfare statutes and
interfering with the expression of speech integral to the proper functioning
of the judiciary.142 The funded program was designed to facilitate private
speech in a public forum rather than convey a government message.143

134. Id. at 835.
135. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
136. Id. at 586.
137. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73 (1998) (holding that public forum principles do not
generally apply to a public television station's editorial judgments regarding the private
speech presented to viewers).
138. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
139. See id. at 537–38, 549.
140. Id. at 541–43 (noting that Rust involved the government disbursing funds to support
a government message whereas the law at issue sought to restrict the private speech of
lawyers speaking on behalf of indigent clients).
141. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (noting that the government sought “to use an existing
medium of expression,” the lawyer-client relationship, “and to control it, in a class of cases,
in ways which distort its usual functioning”).
143. Id. at 542 (“[T]he [Legal Services Corporation] program was designed to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”).
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Additionally, the restriction could be redefined post-enactment to include
a programmatic government message.144 If private speech is involved, then
the defined main purpose cannot be aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.145 The Court did not address whether statutes could have more than
one main purpose.
e. United States v. American Library Ass’n
United States v. American Library Ass’n146 further clarified the
distinction between government speech and the public forum doctrine.147
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion found that internet access in
public libraries did not constitute a designated public forum deserving of
strict scrutiny protection because viewpoint-based restrictions are improper
only “‘when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal
of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers.’”148 A public forum can only be created by an
affirmative government decision to create such a forum; however, acquiring
internet terminals does not create a forum in libraries.149 The law denied a
benefit to no one by merely insisting that funds be spent for their authorized
purpose of helping public libraries provide quality educational and
informational materials.150
B. Conditional Foreign Aid & The Leadership Act
This section describes the contours of government funding in the context
of foreign aid, specifically the Leadership Act. It first discusses the limits
of conditional spending for foreign aid. It then explains the purpose, text,
and effects of the Leadership Act of 2003, which conditions funding for
NGO’s fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the adoption of a policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.
1. Conditional Funding & Foreign Affairs
While foreign aid has long been considered an instrument or tool of U.S.
foreign policy, many commentators have concluded that foreign policy is
inevitably infused with American moral values.151 The promotion of
144. Id. at 547 (finding that the purpose could not be redefined as “help[ing] the current
welfare system function in a more efficient and fair manner”).
145. Id. at 548–49 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540, 548 (1983), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
146. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
147. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207–08 (2003).
148. Id. at 213 n.7 (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 228–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See generally Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag Rule: Undermining National
Interests by Doing unto Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home, 40
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 587, 588–92 (2007); Ernest W. Lefever, Morality Versus Moralism in
Foreign Policy, in ETHICS AND WORLD POLITICS: FOUR PERSPECTIVES 1, 11 (Ernest W.
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American values and foreign policy abroad is nevertheless entwined with
the pursuit of “national interest.”152 Although the Constitution provides
Congress and the president shared powers over foreign affairs,153 beginning
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president has been the dominant force
setting U.S. objectives in foreign policy.154 Congress distributed funds for
governmental initiatives furthering U.S. foreign policy abroad to many
agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC).155 USAID, the main agency involved
in foreign aid, has two interconnected explicit purposes: (1) to promote
democracy abroad and (2) to provide foreign aid to the developing world.156
U.S. foreign aid is really a misnomer because it “has never been an
unconditional transfer of financial resources.”157 The United States really
provides assistance subject to conditions and policies intended to serve
national interests.158 Identical to domestic spending, U.S. foreign aid “may
attach conditions that ensure use of the resources exclusively for advancing
the spread and stability of political democracies and free markets, or for

Lefever ed., 1988); Arthur Schlesinger, National Interests and Moral Absolutes, in ETHICS
AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 151, at 21, 24 (describing the problematic relationship
between morality and international politics).
152. See Lefever, supra note 151, at 12.
153. See Richard Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, DEP’T
ST. BULL., June 1, 1999, http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm (detailing the division of powers
between Congress and the President in foreign affairs); Nina J. Crimm, Toward Facilitating
a Voice for Politically Marginalized Minorities and Enhancing Presidential Public
Accountability and Transparency in Foreign Health Policy Making, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1053, 1080–81 (2006) (discussing the separation of powers in foreign
policy).
154. See LEE H. HAMILTON, A CREATIVE TENSION: THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 6, 9, 15, 42, 44 (2002) (discussing the increased power of the
president in the modern era); Crimm, supra note 153, at 1081–85 (discussing the rise of the
President as the “dominant foreign policymaker”); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” (quoting 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1822))).
155. See generally CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23
(2011). International developmental aid also is made available through the U.S. Department
of State. Id. at 21–22.
156. Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012)
(“U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America’s
[foreign policy] interests while improving lives in the developing world. . . . Spending less
than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works in over 100 countries” to achieve
these goals by “protect[ing] human rights” and “improv[ing] global health.”). For more on
USAID’s mission to spread democracy and advance U.S. foreign policy interests, see
generally USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM,
SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY (2002).
157. TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 15 (1971) (concluding that the “conditions
attached to aid are clearly and directly intended to serve the interests of the governments
providing it”).
158. Id.
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enhancing the health, education, and economic well-being of populations in
developing countries.”159
2. The Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act:
Enactment, Execution and Effects
This section outlines one particular example of conditional foreign aid:
the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act. This
section discusses the congressional history and purpose of the Leadership
Act; the text of the statute itself; and the effects of the Act on foreign aid,
the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the response to its implementation.
a. The Purpose of the Act
The United States has been fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic since
1986.160 The most recent initiatives in the fight against this epidemic began
in 2001 in response to a declaration in the United Nations that encouraged
all members to create policies and dedicate aid towards the prevention,
treatment, and collaboration needed to not only halt but also reverse the
worldwide HIV/AIDS pandemic.161 President Bush followed suit in his
2003 State of the Union Address by announcing a comprehensive, five-year
global strategy to fight HIV/AIDS, which included an Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).162 Under PEPFAR, both USAID and HHS, along
with five other agencies, implement prevention, care, and treatment
programs for HIV/AIDS.163 USAID supports implementation through
direct in-country presence and regional programs, while HHS operates in
developing countries and conducts research.164 As a part of the HHS, CDC
assists with surveillance, training, evaluation and implementation of HIV/
AIDS prevention, treatment and care by partnering with governments,
NGOs, international organizations, U.S.-based universities, and the private
sector.165
The United States finally joined the United Nations’ global strategy to
fight HIV/AIDS when Congress passed the Leadership Act on May 21,
2003.166 The law established the largest financial commitment to
combating the international HIV/AIDS epidemic ever.167 The Act’s
159. See Crimm, supra note 151, at 589.
160. See supra note 11; see also Presidential Remarks, supra note 11.
161. See G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001).
162. See George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_012803.html.
163. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR, ACTION TODAY, A
FOUNDATION FOR TOMORROW: THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF 145–
54 (2006), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/60813.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 22 U.S.C. § 7671(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
167. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(28)–(29) (2006). The Leadership Act first dedicated 15 billion
dollars for the 2004–2008 fiscal years. Id. The current version of the Act provides 48 billion
dollars over a five-year period beginning on October 1, 2008. Id. § 7671 (Supp. V 2011).
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purpose was to strengthen U.S. leadership and the effectiveness of the
country’s response to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.168
The five-year strategy included several avenues for implementation
including service delivery,169 improved treatment and prevention programs
(especially for those at the highest risk for contracting the disease),170 and
improved technical assistance, training, and research.171 An HIV/AIDS
Response Coordinator was established to authorize the use of funds,172 to
combat HIV/AIDS,173 assist children and families,174 and provide expanded
debt relief.175
The Act was based on extensive findings.176 It began with both
general177 and specific178 findings about the extent of the epidemic and then
focused on addressing its behavioral causes.179 The Act even expresses
support for the role of private partners and NGOs in fighting HIV/AIDS.180
The Act also identifies prostitution and sex trafficking181 as one of the
major behavioral causes and contributing factors to the spread of
HIV/AIDS and states that a U.S. policy goal is to eradicate prostitution as a
principal means of combating the spread of the disease.182 While a number
168. Id. § 7603.
169. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, § 5(101)(2) at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N.
712, 712 (emphasizing an approach based on local delivery).
170. See 22 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(5) (Supp. V 2011).
171. See id. § 7611(a)(8)–(10).
172. See id. § 7612.
173. See id. § 7631. Funds were also appropriated to use for malaria and tuberculosis.
See id. §§ 7632–7633.
174. See id. §§ 7651–7655.
175. See id. § 7681.
176. Congress had forty-one “findings” in total. § 7601 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
177. Id. § 7601(1) (detailing the “pandemic proportions” of the spread of the disease
worldwide).
178. Id. § 7601(2) (suggesting that over 65 million people have been infected, more than
25,000,000 have died, and more than 14,000,000 children have been orphaned since the
pandemic began).
179. See generally id. § 7611(a)(4) (finding abstinence from sexual activity, substance
abuse, monogamy, faithfulness, the effective use of condoms as well as “prostitution, the sex
trade, rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation of women and children” to be main
behavioral risks that should be addressed in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic).
180. See id. § 7601(18) (acknowledging that “nongovernmental organizations . . . have
proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic”); id. § 7621(b)(1) (finding that “the
sustainment and promotion of public-private partnerships should be a priority element of the
strategy pursued by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other global
health crises”).
181. Sex trafficking is defined as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.” Id. § 7102(9).
182. The Act stated:
Prostitution and other sexual victimization are degrading to women and children
and it should be the policy of the United States to eradicate such practices. The
sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such industry, and sexual violence
are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. One
in nine South Africans is living with AIDS, and sexual assault is rampant, at a
victimization rate of one in three women. Meanwhile in Cambodia, as many as 40
percent of prostitutes are infected with HIV and the country has the highest rate of
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of strategies continue to be employed to combat HIV/AIDS,183 Congress
made the policy choice that sex trafficking and prostitution should be
considered inimical to reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic worldwide.184
Other advocates for these populations maintain that the imposition of harsh
criminal penalties for prostitution runs contrary to accepted best practices of
public health.185
b. The Text of the Act
Based on the findings that prostitution and sex trafficking are degrading
to women and children,186 Congress imposed two prostitution-related
conditions on the receipt of Leadership Act funds: a funding provision
(Funding Restriction) prohibiting the use of funds to promote or advocate
the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking;187 and the
Policy Requirement, requiring recipients to adopt a policy explicitly
opposing both practices.188 The Funding Restriction does not preclude
increase of HIV infection in all of Southeast Asia. Victims of coercive sexual
encounters do not get to make choices about their sexual activities.
Id. § 7601(23).
183. See Proven HIV Prevention Methods, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention
(June 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/HIVFactSheets/Methods-508.pdf
(discussing a range of prevention techniques needed to combat HIV/AIDS, including testing,
medication, access to condoms, at-risk prevention programs and substance abuse treatment).
Several countries have implemented effective programs that have addressed the
idiosyncrasies of their culture. See GLOBAL HIV PREVENTION WORKING GRP, PROVEN HIV
PREVENTION STRATEGIES 4 (Aug. 2006) available at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/
upload/050106_HIVPreventionStrategies.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of public
awareness, promotion of abstinence and monogamy efforts, free HIV testing, universal
access to treatment and other strategies in several countries); UNAIDS, HIV PREVENTION
NEEDS AND SUCCESSES: A TALE OF THREE COUNTRIES (2001) available at
http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub02/jc535-hi_en.pdf
(discussing
contrasting
strategies for combating HIV/AIDS in Senegal, Thailand, and Uganda).
184. See Joanna Busza, Having the Rug Pulled from Under Your Feet: One Project’s
Experience of the U.S. Policy Reversal on Sex Work, 21 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 329, 330–
31 (2006) (describing the House Committee on International Relations’ criticism of
providing health care to sex workers).
185. See Edi C. M. Kinney, Appropriations for the Abolitionists: Undermining Effects of
the U.S. Mandatory Anti-prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and
HIV/AIDS, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 158, 160 (2006); Press Release, ACLU,
Global AIDS Gag Holds Critical Funding Captive to Politics (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/global-aids-gag-holds-critical-funding-captive-politics
[hereinafter Funding Captive to Politics].
186. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23).
187. Id. § 7631(e) (“No funds made available to carry out this chapter, or any amendment
made by this chapter, may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of
prostitution or sex trafficking.”).
188. See 22 U.S.C § 7631(f). In December 2003, Congress passed the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which has two provisions mimicking the Leadership Act’s
Funding Restriction and Policy Requirement. First, the TVPA provides funding for antitrafficking activities on the condition that no funds be used to “promote, support or advocate
the legalization or practice of prostitution.” See id. § 7110(g)(1). The TVPA also provided
funding on the condition that the recipient organizations state “in either a grant application, a
grant agreement, or both, that it does not promote, support or advocate the legalization or
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organizations from providing palliative care, post-exposure treatments, and
“necessary pharmaceutical and commodities” such as test kits, condoms, or
potentially microbicides.189 While the Policy Requirement prohibits
distributing funds to any organization that does not have a policy explicitly
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, the restriction exempted three
notable HIV/AIDS organizations dedicated to developing preventative HIV
vaccines as well as “any United Nations agency.”190
USAID, CDC and HHS have wavered when implementing the Policy
Requirement. Initially in 2004, USAID provided minimal guidance, but
refrained from applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based NGOs
because the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) found
that applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based organizations would
unconstitutionally restrict First Amendment free speech rights.191 The OLC
later retracted its previous “tentative advice” and, in June 2005, USAID
issued a directive requiring both U.S. and foreign NGOs to comply with the
Policy Requirement.192 In the midst of litigation with both Alliance for
Open Society International and DKT International, both HHS and USAID
amended their guidelines in 2007 to give recipients the ability to partner
with affiliate organizations that do comply with the requirement.193 The
2007 guidelines attempted to clarify the separation required between

practice of prostitution.” See id. § 7110(g)(2). Unlike the Leadership Act, the TVPA
exempted organizations that provide “assistance designed to promote the purposes of this
Act by ameliorating the suffering of, or health risks to, victims while they are being
trafficked or after they are out of the situation that resulted from such victims being
trafficked.”). Id. § 7710(g)(1). Despite the TVPA’s similarity, these provisions have not
been challenged in any litigation to date. For more on the definitions, causes, and concerns
about sex trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, see Theodore R. Sangalis,
Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (2011).
189. Id. § 7631(f).
190. Id. (exempting the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World
Health Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and any U.N. agency).
191. See USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD),
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE, LIMITATION ON THE USE OF
FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (Jan. 15, 2004). See
generally Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 225–27 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d
127 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the history of the policy directives).
192. USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA ACT
OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION
AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2–4 (June 9, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 POLICY DIRECTIVE]; see Alliance
IV, 651 F.3d at 225.
193. See USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), AMENDMENT
1, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS AND OPPOSITION
TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (July 23, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 POLICY
DIRECTIVE].
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recipients and any partner or affiliate organizations by modifying the
affiliate requirement of “objective integrity and independence.”194
In April 2010, in the midst of continued litigation, HHS and USAID
changed the required affirmation statement and modified the guidance on
partnering affiliate separation.195 The 2010 guidelines provide that a
Leadership Act recipient must affirmatively declare its opposition to
prostitution and sex trafficking in the funding contract “because of the
psychological and physical risks they pose for women, men, and
children”196 and reaffirm that it “cannot engage in activities that are
inconsistent with [its] opposition to prostitution.”197 Despite these
clarifications and continued amendments, recipient organizations have
continued to complain that the guidelines fail to define what activities may
be deemed “inconsistent” with an “opposition to prostitution” under the
Policy Requirement.198
The Guidelines now provide that adequate separation would be
determined with “more flexibility for funding recipients” on a case-by-case
basis, assessed according to five, nonexclusive factors: (1) the separation of
personnel, management, and governance; (2) the separation of accounts and
records; (3) the separation between the recipient and the affiliate’s facilities;
(4) the separation of identifying signs and forms; and (5) the degree of
public association between the affiliate’s restricted activities and the
government.199
c. The Effects of the Act
Many organizations that receive funding from the Leadership Act protest
the implementation of the Policy Requirement, not because they support
194. The previous guidelines required legal, financial, and physical separation of
affiliates. See Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the
United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 72 Fed.
Reg. 41, 076, 41,076–77 (July 26, 2007); 2007 POLICY DIRECTIVE, supra note 193, at 2; 2005
POLICY DIRECTIVE, supra note 192, at 2–4.
195. See Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Organizational Integrity of Entities That Are
Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760,
18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2011)) [hereinafter 2010 HHS
Guidelines]; USAID, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE (AAPD), AMENDMENT
3, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003, AS AMENDED—ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS
AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter 2010
Policy Directive].
196. 45 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2011); 2010 Policy Directive, supra note 195, at 2.
197. 2010 HHS Guidelines, 75 Fed.Reg. at 18,760.
198. The Plaintiffs in Alliance for Open Society brought claims based on the Act’s
definition of “promoting prostitution.” Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency
for Int’l Dev. (Alliance II), 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For more on the Act’s
failure to define “promoting prostitution,” see generally Sung Chang, Note & Comment,
Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: The Leadership Act, USAID, and the HHS Guidelines’
Failure to Define “Promoting Prostitution,” 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 373
(2011).
199. See 45 C.F.R. § 89.3(b) (2011).
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prostitution or sex-trafficking per se, but because the Policy Requirement
chills HIV/AIDS outreach and treatment programs.200
The Policy
Requirement not only violates best practices policy, but alienates and
stigmatizes the same population the NGO had sought funding to support.201
In February 2005, a group of nonprofit organizations, including CARE,
Save the Children, and the International Center for Research on Women,
wrote a letter to Randall Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance,
protesting the Policy Requirement.202 In August 2005, a group of over 100
nonprofits countered by signing a letter to President George H.W. Bush
supporting the policy.203
The Policy Requirement had immediate consequences for HIV/AIDS
NGOs worldwide. Brazil rejected approximately $40 million in USAID
money because the Policy Requirement would interfere with its successful
anti-HIV/AIDS program.204 Brazil’s AIDS commissioner Pedro Chequer
even explained the importance of working with at-risk populations, stating,
“‘They are our partners. How could we ask prostitutes to take a position

200. See Brief for AIDS Action and Twenty-Five Other Public Health Organizations and
Public Health Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8, Alliance of
Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007) (No.
06-4035-cv), 2006 WL 5582287 at *8 [hereinafter Brief for AIDS Action] (discussing how
the Policy Requirement “threatens to alienate the communities with which they work”); CTR.
FOR HEALTH & GENDER EQUITY, POLICY BRIEF: IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY RESTRICTIONS
FOR HIV PROGRAMS AIMED AT COMMERCIAL SEX WORKERS (2008) [hereinafter H&G
POLICY BRIEF], available at http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/
aplobrief.pdf.
201. See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (Alliance I),
430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for
cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (finding that the stigmatizing effect of the Policy
Requirement could push these at-risk groups underground); Erica Tracy Kagan, Morality v.
Reality: The Struggle to Effectively Fight HIV/AIDS and Respect Human Rights, 32 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 1201, 1224 (2007) (describing the stigmatizing effect of the Policy Requirement);
cf. USAID, LEADING THE WAY: USAID RESPONDS TO HIV/AIDS 1997–2000 (2001)
[hereinafter LEADING THE WAY] (finding that working with community sex workers gives
credibility, reduces fear, and makes the HIV/AIDS work more successful); Aziza Ahmed,
Feminism, Power, and Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women’s
Health, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 225, 240 (2011) (describing the need for encouraging work
with at-risk groups like prostitutes).
202. David Brown, U.S. Backs Off Stipulation on AIDS Funds, WASH. POST., May 18,
2005, at A9.
203. Paul Lachynsky, Over 100 Groups Urge Bush to Enforce Anti-prostitution Policy to
Aid Sexually Exploited Women and Children, MED. NEWS TODAY (Aug. 8, 2005),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/28834.php.
204. See, e.g., Esther Kaplan, Just Say Não, NATION, May 30, 2005, at 4; Matt Mofett &
Michael M. Phillips, Brazil Refuses U.S. AIDS Funds, Rejects Conditions, WALL ST. J., May
2, 2005, at A3 (stating that the Brazilian government turned down $40 million in antiHIV/AIDS funding instead of complying with the Policy Requirement).
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against themselves?’”205 The Policy Requirement has also impacted
programs in Thailand, India, Mali, Bangladesh, and Cambodia.206
Additionally, the Center for Health and Gender Equality published a
policy brief (H&G Policy Brief) in 2008 that explained how the Policy
Requirement negatively impacted women’s health abroad.207 The H&G
Policy Brief, using a 2006 field study, asserted that the Policy Requirement
undermined public health best practices by undercutting the trust and
credibility that HIV/AIDS NGOs need to foster in order to work with sex
workers and trafficked persons, who are one of the groups at the highest
risk for becoming infected with HIV.208 The study also found that
“reaching sex workers [w]as the biggest challenge to their work” because
sex workers do not disclose their vocation to those they do not know.209
Thus, the adoption of the Policy Requirement has alienated trafficked
persons and prostitutes and prevented them from receiving the needed aid
that the Leadership Act meant to provide.210
The H&G Policy Brief asserted that the HIV/AIDS work of many
HIV/AIDS NGOs has suffered after the implementation of the Policy
Requirement.211 The adoption of the Policy Requirement has created
tension between programmatic success and funding, caused a chilling effect
on organizations which results in self-censorship, curtailed effective HIV
prevention programs, and exacerbated the stigma and isolation for already
marginalized persons and groups.212
205. Kaplan, supra note 204, at 4; see also Moffett & Phillips, supra note 204 (quoting
Chequer, who said the Policy Requirement was an “‘interference that harms the Brazilian
policy regarding diversity, ethical principles and human rights’”).
206. See Sexworkerspresent, Taking the Pledge, BLIP (Nov. 1, 2008), http://blip.tv/
sexworkerspresent/taking-the-pledge-185356 (detailing the negative effects the Policy
Requirement has had on prostitutes in Thailand, India, Mali, Bangladesh, Brazil, and
Cambodia, including less access to condoms, increased poverty, and less prevention centers)
[hereinafter Taking the Pledge]; see also Brief for AIDS Action, supra note 200, at 18–20;
Alliance of Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843 (2d Cir.
2007) (No. 06-4035-cv), 2006 WL 5582287 at *18–20 (discussing how the Policy
Requirement is already impeding NGOs’ efforts to combat HIV/AIDS).
207. See H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2 (discussing the development of
programs designed to educate sex workers about condom use); see also Sheetal Doshi, Sex
Workers on the Front Line of Prevention, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 30, 2006,
1:15am), http://www.icij.org/projects/divine-intervention/sex-workers-front-line-prevention
(discussing an effective strategy implemented by one anti-AIDS organization in India). The
H&G Policy Brief also challenged the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement in passing.
H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2.
208. H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 2; Brief for AIDS Action, supra note 200, at
9, 14 (detailing how the Policy Requirement contradicts “best practice[s]” for HIV/AIDS
prevention and care).
209. H&G POLICY BRIEF, supra note 200, at 3.
210. Id. The H&G Policy Brief even detailed one organization whose program had been
recognized as a U.N. AIDS “best practice,” but had suffered a serious decline after
conforming to the Policy Requirement mandated by the Leadership Act. Id. at 3.
211. Id. at 4 (describing the sharp declines in HIV/AIDS education and the monthly
condom distribution rate).
212. Id. at 2–6; Taking the Pledge, supra note 206 (interviewing several sex workers
about the negative impacts of the Policy Requirement on their lives).
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The H&G Policy Brief’s suspicions have since been confirmed by other
sources.213 It has even been suggested that the negative fallout of the
United States’ expanded so-called global gag order against HIV/AIDS work
with high-risk populations is tantamount to “public health malpractice.”214
The Policy Requirement’s effects on anti–human trafficking initiatives are
less well documented, but one commentator suggests they are equally as
detrimental.215
Activism against the Policy Requirement has not abated. In July 2012,
HIV/AIDS activists protested the Policy Requirement both domestically
and abroad.216 The United Nation’s Development Program even published
a report in September 2012 denouncing the Policy Requirement and
recommending its repeal.217
II. MUST THE PAID PIPER PLAY THE TUNE?: CONFLICT AMONG COURTS
OVER WHETHER THE LEADERSHIP ACT’S POLICY REQUIREMENT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGES ON RECIPIENT NGOS’ FREE SPEECH
Part II of this Note details the conflict between the U.S. Courts of
Appeals over the Leadership Act’s Policy Requirement. Courts differ on
whether the Policy Requirement places an unconstitutional condition on
federal funding to be distributed to domestic NGOs combating the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, thereby impermissibly discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint.
Additionally, courts are split on whether the Policy
Requirement compels unwilling NGOs to convey a government message.
In the following sections, this Note examines the three approaches to these
issues. Part II.A discusses the 2007 decision of the D.C. Circuit, DKT
International v. U.S. Agency for International Development,218 which

213. See Funding Captive to Politics, supra note 185 (discussing the alliance of many
signatory organizations who filed an amicus brief in the Alliance for Open Society
litigation); Susan A. Cohen, Ominous Convergence: Sex Trafficking, Prostitution and
International Family Planning, 8 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 12–13 (2005)
(discussing the counterproductive interventions of antiabortion and anti-prostitution
campaigns on public health).
214. See Kinney, supra note 185, at 164 (discussing the implications of the Policy
Requirement on public health); Funding Captive to Politics, supra note 185; see also
Mehilka Hoodbhoy et al., Exporting Despair: The Human Rights Implications of U.S.
Restrictions on Foreign Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2005)
(suggesting that current U.S. funding policies may violate international human rights
obligations such as the right to health).
215. Kinney, supra note 185, at 181–90.
216. Claire Provost, Anti-prostitution Pledge in US Aids Funding “Damaging” HIV
Response, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/2012/jul/24/prostitution-us-aids-funding-sex?CMP=email (describing protests
in Washington, D.C., and Kolkata, India).
217. U.N. DEVELOPMENT POLICY, HIV/AIDS GROUP, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND
THE LAW: RISKS, RIGHTS AND HEALTH ¶ 3.2.8, 43 (2012) (“Repeal punitive conditions in
official development assistance—such as the United States government’s PEPFAR antiprostitution pledge and its current anti-trafficking regulations—that inhibit sex workers’
access to HIV services or their ability to form organisations in their own interests.”).
218. 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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upheld the policy requirement. Part II.B discusses the majority decision in
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for
International Development219 in the Second Circuit, which struck down the
Policy Requirement as compelled speech and viewpoint discriminatory.
Part II.C discusses Judge Straub’s dissent in the Second Circuit, which
found that the Policy Requirement did not impermissibly burden the
recipients’ free speech rights.
A. DKT International and the D.C. Circuit
DKT International is an organization that provides family planning and
AIDS prevention programming in eighteen different countries around the
world.220 In June 2005, Family Health International (FHI), a family
planning NGO in Vietnam, attempted to contract DKT to operate as a
subgrantee to run a USAID-funded program and provided DKT with an
agreement, which included the certification that DKT had a policy
“explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” in conformity with the
Leadership Act Policy Requirement.221 DKT refused to comply with the
Policy Requirement.222 FHI cancelled the grant and informed DKT that
funding had been discontinued.223 Unlike other HIV/AIDS NGOs, DKT
did not depend on government funding to operate, with only 16 percent of
its total budget coming from USAID grants.224 DKT then filed a complaint
for an injunction on the use of the Policy Requirement.225
This section discusses the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in DKT, which held that
the Policy Requirement is a permissible funding condition because it
neither imposes a penalty on protected First Amendment rights nor
discriminates in a way aimed at the suppression of ideas.226 First, this
section outlines the court’s argument that the Policy Requirement does not
suppress an unpopular idea. Then, it details the court’s determination that
this Policy Requirement does not impermissibly discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint and allows for alternate routes of expression. Finally, this
section explains the court’s determination that the government had not
created a forum for public speech nor encouraged private speech. As such,
the Policy Requirement was a permissible condition to prevent the
government’s message from being distorted.

219. 651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.
2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 2586932 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (No. 12-10).
220. DKT INTERNATIONAL, http://dktinternational.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012); see
DKT, 477 F.3d at 760.
221. DKT, 477 F.3d at 760.
222. Id. at 761.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 760.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 764.
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1. The Policy Requirement Does Not Attempt to Suppress
an Unpopular Idea
The D.C. Circuit upheld the Policy Requirement as a constitutional
condition on federal funds, finding that “[t]he Act does not compel DKT to
advocate the government’s position on prostitution and sex trafficking; it
requires only that if DKT wishes to receive funds it must communicate the
message the government chooses to fund.”227 Under the government
speech doctrine, the court found that the government can discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint when communicating a government message to make
sure that the message is properly communicated.228 While the choice to
fund certain activities at the exclusion of others will necessarily
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, that choice is problematic only when
made to suppress a dangerous idea.229
The D.C. Circuit recognized that the Policy Requirement was not
intended to suppress the expression of NGOs desiring to remain silent or
oppose the government’s message against prostitution and sex
trafficking.230 Instead, the court found that the Policy Requirement nobly
aimed to eradicate prostitution and reduce the behavioral risks that cause
the spread of the HIV epidemic.231
2. Alternative Routes of Expression Remain Available
The court also found that the Policy Requirement did nothing to prevent
an NGO from speaking its own message either by rejecting the funding or
alternatively creating a subsidiary or affiliate organization that agrees to the
policy opposing prostitution.232 Like in Rust, where the clinic could
advocate abortion if it conducted that activity “through programs that are
separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds,”233 a
subsidiary could adopt the Policy Requirement while the parent
organization remains independent according to the USAID and HHS
guidelines.234
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 127–29, 143 and accompanying text.
229. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (“When it communicates its message . . . the government
can—and often must—discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.” (citing Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))). The Court makes several
comparisons to illustrate this point. Id. (finding that if the government funds Nancy Reagan’s
“Just Say No” anti-drug campaign, it is not constitutionally required to simultaneously
sponsor a “Just Say Yes” pro-drug campaign). Other courts have found similar illustrations
useful. See, e.g., DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that a Surgeon General’s activities against smoking does not
require a simultaneous program supporting smoking activities).
230. DKT, 477 F.3d at 764 (finding that the Policy Requirement was only aimed at trying
to encourage a government message, not suppressing speech).
231. Id. at 761 (detailing the objective of the Leadership Act to “eradicate HIV/AIDS”).
232. Id. at 763.
233. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1990).
234. DKT, 477 F.3d at 763.
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The D.C. Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement did not restrict
any recipient’s First Amendment speech outside the scope of the recipient’s
participation in the government program.235 While the DKT court
acknowledged that, unlike Rust, the Leadership Act placed restrictions on
grantees, as opposed to just projects, it held that DKT could remain neutral
by setting up a subsidiary or affiliate organization.236 The Policy
Requirement’s effect on the entire organization rather than the funded
project does not prevent the recipient NGO from remaining neutral.237
Several other courts have echoed the DKT court’s finding that conditional
subsidies with independent affiliate requirements cure any constitutional
difficulty by allowing the recipients to confine the speech condition to the
federally funded program.238
3. The Government Had Not Created a Forum for Speech
or Encouraged Private Speech
As elucidated above, a government condition becomes unconstitutional
not only when it impermissibly discriminates by viewpoint but also when it
operates as a coercive penalty.239 A government condition becomes
coercive if it forces the recipient to convey a message with which it would
not otherwise agree.240 The D.C. Circuit adopted a narrow reading of Rust
and Rosenberger, finding that the Policy Requirement had not created a
quasi-public forum for private speakers to voice their viewpoint.241 The
interpretation rested on the distinction between government subsidy
programs that provide funds to encourage private speech in a public forum
and those that “use private speakers to transmit specific information
pertaining to its own program.”242 Citing Rosenberger, Rust, and DKT
Memorial International v. U.S. Agency for International Development,243
the court found that the government may constitutionally communicate a
particular viewpoint through agents and require that those agents not

235. Id. at 764.
236. Id. at 763.
237. Id.
238. See Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d 458,
463–64 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a Missouri statute “requir[ing] abortion services to be
provided through independent affiliates”); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding regulations “requir[ing] that if a
recipient wishes to engage in prohibited activities, it must establish an organization separate
from the recipient in order to ensure that federal funds are not spent on prohibited
activities”).
239. See supra Part I.A.2.
240. See supra Part I.A.1.
241. DKT, 477 F.3d at 762 (“Here too the government has not created ‘a program to
encourage private speech’ . . . [i]n this case, as in Rust, ‘the government’s own message is
being delivered.’” (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1984),
and Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001))).
242. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
243. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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convey contrary messages.244 While the law at issue in Rust only
demanded that programs and not the entire organization convey a message,
the D.C. Circuit suggested that DKT could avoid adopting an organizationwide policy and still receive funding by setting up a separate subsidiary
organization with an antiprostitution policy that could receive and spend the
Agency’s funds.245
The D.C. Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement was not meant
to encourage private speech.246 The government can make sure that its
agents do not “convey contrary messages,” and that its “message is
Because the
conveyed in an efficient and effective fashion.”247
government’s program would be undermined if recipients hired to
implement the program could advance alternative viewpoints at the same
time, the court upheld the Policy Requirement.248
The D.C. Circuit also added that when the government speaks on matters
with foreign policy implications, the government has a heightened incentive
to protect its viewpoint.249 While admitting that the government’s main
objective in the Leadership Act was to “eradicate HIV/AIDS,” the D.C.
Circuit also found that government speech was a primary means of
achieving that objective.250 Plaintiffs never contested the legitimate
government interest in eradicating HIV/AIDS or ending prostitution and sex
trafficking.251 The court found that both objectives are equally integral to
Congressional intent.252 The legitimacy of the government interest was not
weakened by the exemptions to the Policy Requirement provided to select
organizations.253 Fundamentally, “[s]pending money to convince people at
244. DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (“The government may speak through . . . government officers
and employees . . . . Or it may hire private agents to speak for it. . . . When it communicates
its message, either through public officials or private entities, the government can—and
often must—discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.” (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
196 (1990), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), &
DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 289)).
245. Id. at 763.
246. Id. at 762.
247. Id. (finding that the government can “use criteria to ensure” that its agents do “not
convey contrary messages” and that its “message is conveyed in an efficient and effective
fashion”); cf. DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 290–91 (holding that the government has long held
the ability to maintain its own message).
248. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 762–63.
249. Id. at 762 (finding that “where the government is speaking on matters with foreign
policy implications, as it is here,” the government has a more legitimate interest in ensuring
that its speech is “‘neither garbled nor distorted’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))); DKT Mem’l, 887 F.2d at 289–91 (“To hold that
the United States government cannot make viewpoint-based choices in foreign affairs would
not only depart from settled precedent, but would work much mischief.”).
250. See DKT, 477 F.3d at 761 (finding that the Leadership Act necessitated the “United
States to speak out against legalizing prostitution in other countries” and “not merely to ship
condoms and medicine to regions where the disease is rampant”).
251. See id. at 761 (describing both objectives of the Leadership Act).
252. Id.
253. See id. at 763 n.5 (“[T]he Act’s underinclusiveness does not violate the First
Amendment. . . . Because viewpoint discrimination raises no First Amendment concerns
when the government is speaking, the underinclusiveness of the certification requirement is
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risk of HIV/AIDS to change their behavior is necessarily a message.”254
Because the condition did not compel the recipient “to advocate the
government’s position on prostitution and sex trafficking,” the DKT court
concluded that the Policy Requirement need not be subjected to any
heightened scrutiny255 and did not violate the First Amendment.256
B. Alliance for Open Society and the Second Circuit
Alliance for Open Society Institute (AOSI) and Pathfinder are both
independent U.S.-based NGOs actively engaged in the worldwide effort to
combat HIV and AIDS.257 Both organizations work closely with
populations that have a high-risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, including drug
users, victims of sex trafficking, and prostitutes.258 Both NGOs, like DKT
International, engage with these at-risk groups to improve accessibility and
create other gateways to prevention within the general population.259 Both
NGOs receive financial assistance from the U.S. government through the
USAID,260 as well as from private sources.261
In 2005, USAID told AOSI that their guidelines did not comply with the
Policy Requirement.262 AOSI and the Open Society Institute quickly filed
suit, challenging the provision, and Pathfinder quickly joined.263 In 2006,
the district judge issued a preliminary injunction preventing the agencies
from enforcing the Policy Requirement against the NGOs because the
condition impermissibly banned protected speech.264 After the case was
remanded when HHS and USAID published new guidelines,265 the district
immaterial.” (citing Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 250–51 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J.,
concurring))).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 761–63 (applying a more deferential lower standard of scrutiny, though not
explicitly stated, based on the overinclusivity and underinclusivity of the Policy
Requirement).
256. Id. at 764.
257. See Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 218 (2d
Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 232.
260. Pathfinder receives additional funds from other agencies such as the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Center for Disease Control
(CDC). See id. at 230–31.
261. Alliance for Open Society is closely affiliated with, though independent of, the Open
Society Institute established and financed by George Soros, which supports a network of
more than thirty foundations that operate worldwide. Id. at 230. Alliance for Open Society
has received financial support from USAID but has also received a private grant from the
Open Society Institute of nearly $2.2 million. Id. Pathfinder has similar utilized grants from
private sources to fund many of its programs related to family planning and reproductive
health services. Id.
262. Id. at 237.
263. Id. at 237–38.
264. Id. at 276.
265. Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, 45 C.F.R. pt. 89 (2011); 2007 POLICY
DIRECTIVE, supra note 193, at 3.
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court stood by its first decision, striking down the Policy Requirement a
second time,266 and the Second Circuit ultimately affirmed.267
This section discusses the Second Circuit’s majority decision in Alliance
for Open Society,268 along with the Southern District of New York and D.C.
District Courts,269 which struck down the Leadership Act’s Policy
Requirement as an unconstitutional condition on federal funds.270 This
section outlines the standard that Second Circuit adopts for evaluating
whether a conditional subsidy unconstitutional infringes on First
Amendment free speech rights. It then discusses the court’s application of
that standard, finding that the Policy Requirement impermissibly
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and compels speech.
1. The Policy Requirement Impermissibly Compels Recipients
to Espouse the Government’s Position
As seen in Part I.A.1, compelled speech “cannot be squared with the First
Amendment.”271 Because the Policy Requirement forces any recipient to
declare its opposition to prostitution and sex-trafficking, the Second Circuit
compared the Policy Requirement to other compelled speech cases and
found that “silence, or neutrality, is not an option” for any recipient of
Leadership Act funds.272 Conceding that Wooley, Speiser, and Barnette did
not control, the court found those holdings instructive when analyzing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which had never dealt with an
affirmative speech requirement before.273 Because the First Amendment
frowns on affirmative-speech requirements, and because the Policy
Requirement pushed beyond the Regan and Rust progeny, the court found
the Policy Requirement warranted heightened scrutiny.274
The court even found that the Policy Requirement ignored dicta from
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), where the
Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amendment’s requirement that
266. Alliance II, 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir.
2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012).
267. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d
127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
268. Id.
269. Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S.
July 2, 2012); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (DKT I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 5
(D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
270. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 223–24; DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 12–14; Alliance I,
430 F. Supp. 2d at 274–76.
271. Alliance IV, 651 F. 3d at 234.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 234–35 n.3 (“[A]lthough Regan and its progeny unquestionably provide the
framework for our analysis, they do not capture the Policy Requirement as neatly . . . .”).
The Court took away the principle that “the First Amendment does not look fondly on
attempts by the government to affirmatively require speech.” Id.; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
274. Id. at 234–35.
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universities permit military recruiters on campus as a condition of receiving
federal funding.275 The FAIR Court signaled that affirmative governmentpreferred speech raises “serious First Amendment concerns” by noting that
“[t]here is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge
or motto that the school must endorse.”276 Concluding that the result of
FAIR would have been different if a forced pledge or motto had been
required, the Second Circuit found the Policy Requirement to be exactly the
type of government-mandated pledge that FAIR warned about.277 Thus, the
court found that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally compelled the
recipients to speak the government’s message and exceeded the limits of
permissible funding conditions.278
2. The Policy Requirement Impermissibly Discriminates on
the Basis of Viewpoint
The Second Circuit also found that the Policy Requirement constituted
impermissible viewpoint discrimination by requiring the recipients to
endorse the government’s point of view.279 While viewpoint-based
restrictions are presumed unconstitutional under the First Amendment,280
conditional viewpoint-based funding restrictions were found “not
necessarily unconstitutional” under Rust.281 The court added that such
restrictions do merit heightened scrutiny because they are “constitutionally
troublesome.”282 Because it combined both affirmative and viewpointbased speech requirements, the Policy Requirement ultimately failed
heightened scrutiny.283
3. The Policy Requirement Fails Heightened Scrutiny
Having concluded that the Policy Requirement is an affirmative-speech
viewpoint-based funding requirement, the Second Circuit applied an
275. Id. (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 61–62 (2006)).
276. Id. at 234, 235 (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. at 61–62).
277. Id. at 234–35.
278. Id. at 234 (finding that the Policy Requirement “falls well beyond what the Supreme
Court and this Court have upheld as permissible funding conditions”).
279. Id. at 235.
280. See, e.g., supra notes 46–48; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
281. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 235.
282. See id. (finding the dicta by all four dissenting Justices in FCC v. League of Women
Voters to be persuasive that viewpoint-based restrictions are constitutionally problematic);
see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 407–08 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the prohibition’s viewpoint neutral stance was the most
significant and determinative aspect of the restriction). The Second Circuit found added
confirmation for this conclusion in the Legal Services Corporations line of cases. Alliance
IV, 651 F.3d at 235–36; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42
(2001).
283. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236 (finding that the “bold combination . . . of a speechtargeted restriction that is both affirmative and quintessentially viewpoint-based” warranted
heightened scrutiny).
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unspecified heightened scrutiny test.284 The court first questioned whether
the Leadership Act’s purpose is to convey the particular antiprostitution
message285 and distinguished between programs in which conveying a
government message is the stated purpose of the program and those
programs where the message is only secondary.286 Because the Leadership
Act’s primary purpose was to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria,
not to campaign against prostitution,287 the court found that the government
could not retroactively recast the Leadership Act’s purpose as one of
conveying a message against prostitution simply because that would
conveniently give it the ability to compel recipients to affirmatively espouse
its point of view.288 Indeed, the court found that the Leadership Act’s
exemption for some organizations severely undermines the conclusion that
conveying a government message is really so central to the Leadership
Act’s purpose.289
Additionally, because the Policy Requirement is a matter of international
debate and public concern, greater First Amendment protection is
warranted.290 Because it not only bans certain pro-prostitution speech,291
but also precludes silence or neutrality on a “contested public issue,” the
Policy Requirement unfairly skews international debate.292 In fact, the
Policy Requirement runs counter to the best practices for HIV/AIDS

284. See id. at 234, 239 (applying a heightened scrutiny standard and discussing
alternative routes of expression).
285. See id. at 237 (describing the centrality of the antiprostitution message to the
Leadership Act program).
286. Id. (differentiating between government programs whose purpose is to convey a
particular message and those in which the message is secondary); cf. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at
547 (“Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in
every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.”).
287. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 237–38 (finding that the Leadership Act’s purpose is to fight
HIV/AIDS, not to facilitate an “anti-prostitution messaging campaign”).
288. Id. at 238 (“If the government-speech principle allowed Congress to compel funding
recipients to affirmatively espouse its viewpoint on every subsidiary issue subsumed within a
federal spending program, the exception would swallow the rule.”).
289. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006); Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 238 (“In short, the
Agencies’ suggestion that requiring Plaintiffs to adopt an anti-prostitution policy statement is
integral to the Leadership Act program is undermined by the fact that the government has
chosen to fund high-profile, global organizations that remain free to express—and indeed
openly express—a contrary policy, or no policy at all.”).
290. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236; see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980))).
291. The court never actually discusses what sorts of speech are prohibited as
“inconsistent with [an] opposition to the practice[] of prostitution.” 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2011).
The majority did not reach the argument that the Policy Requirement was unconstitutionally
vague because they found the Policy Requirement to be an unconstitutional condition,
though it acknowledged that both parties did not seem to have a good “grasp on what it
means to engage in expression that is ‘inconsistent’ with an opposition to prostitution.”
Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 239–40 n.8.
292. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 236.

2012]

FUNDING CONDITIONS AND FREE SPEECH

1135

prevention.293 Thus, the Policy Requirement might even cause more harm
than good.294 The court overlooked the need for a unified government
message in foreign affairs because the Policy Requirement principally
impacted domestic U.S.-based NGOs’ speech.295
At the trial court level, both district courts also found that the Policy
Requirement was not narrowly tailored to the government objective of
preventing the expression of a contrary message.296 Instead of limiting only
the speech used with federal funds, the Policy Requirement limits the
speech used with both private and public funds by requiring a policy to be
adopted by the entire organization.297
The court found that giving recipient NGOs the ability to engage in
privately funded silence or neutrality provided an inadequate alternative.298
While an affiliate provides the recipient an outlet to express a proprostitution message, the affirmative obligation to speak the government’s
message prevents the recipient from abstaining from the debate
altogether.299 Less restrictive measures exist: a recipient could abide by
the Policy Requirement in the funded-program while being free to speak in
other nonfederally funded programs.300
The Alliance for Open Society district court even suggested that
disclaimers could be used to clarify that particular projects and activities are
privately funded and not support by the government funds, a method far
less restrictive than preventing recipient NGOs from engaging in “any
speech conveying a different viewpoint than the one advanced by the
Consequently, the Policy Requirement was overbroad by
Act.”301
restricting the NGO’s ability to use its own private funding, as opposed to
just its own government funds.302 Because the Policy Requirement
compels grantees to espouse the government’s position on a controversial
issue, the Second Circuit concluded that the Policy Requirement was an
unconstitutional condition placed on the receipt of federal funds.303 One
293. See id. (describing the World Health Organization and the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS’s recognition that advocating for the reduction of penalties for
prostitution in order to stimulate outreach efforts is considered a best practice).
294. Id. (detailing the Policy Requirement’s negative foreign policy implications).
295. Id. at 239 (holding that the domestic impact of the Policy Requirement makes it
“more of a domestic than a foreign concern”).
296. See DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (addressing the overinclusivity of the Policy Requirement); Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d
222, 268–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678
F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012) (addressing the
Policy Requirement’s lack of narrow tailoring).
297. See Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (finding that affirmative or compelled speech
requirements do not address “adequate alternative channels”).
298. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 14.
301. Alliance I, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
302. DKT I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16.
303. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 239 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127,
petition for cert. filed, No. 12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
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other court has noted the unconstitutionality of the Policy Requirement.304
One commentator also agrees with the Second Circuit’s holding, though
suggesting that ultimately Congress should amend the statute to survive
constitutional scrutiny.305
C. Judge Straub’s Dissent in Alliance for Open Society
Judge Straub wrote a spirited and elaborate dissent where he detailed his
version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrinal analysis. When he
applied his test, he found that the Policy Requirement neither discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint nor compelled speech nor acted as a coercive
penalty. He concluded that the Policy Requirement did not merit
heightened scrutiny and, consequently, would have upheld its
constitutionality. This section discusses Judge Straub’s dissent, focusing on
the standard he elaborated and how he applied that standard to reach its
result.
1. A New Framework of Analysis for Unconstitutional Conditions
Judge Straub chided the majority for thinking that affirmative funding
conditions raise more “serious First Amendment concerns” than negative
funding conditions.306 Consequently he found the majority’s reliance on
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,307 Speiser v.
Randall,308 and Wooley v. Maynard309 to be unfounded.310 The majority
characterized those cases, traditionally described to be compelled speech
cases,311 as unconstitutional conditions cases where the government
threatened the denial of an already-existing benefit (“going to school” or
“using the roads”), over which the government had monopolistic control as
a means of coercing the recipients to give up First Amendment rights.312
Judge Straub saw the majority as attempting to “creatively recast” those
304. See Hill v. Kemp, 645 F. Supp. 2d. 992, 1005 (N.D. Okla. 2009) (finding that
because the Leadership compelled an NGO to adopt a policy that would affect its nonfederal funds and because no adequate alternative method allowed the organization to
express a contradictory viewpoint, “the requirement to enact a policy opposing the
legalization of prostitution constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination”).
305. See Garima Malhotra, Comment, Good Intentions, Bad Consequences: How
Congress’s Efforts to Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of Humanitarian Organizations,
61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 860–65 (2012) (finding the Policy Requirement unworkable and
unconstitutional and suggesting Congress should amend the statute to permit organizations
to regulate the process for allocating their own funds while retaining the prohibition on
funding activities related to legalizing prostitution).
306. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 255 (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 234 (majority
opinion)).
307. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
308. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
309. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
310. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256.
311. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (describing
Barnette as a case of “outright compulsion of speech”).
312. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256.
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cases as conditional subsidies and distinguished them as cases that
conditioned benefits on something that the recipient could not realistically
deny: public education or public road use.313 Additionally, the compelled
speech requirements were completely unrelated to the government benefit
at issue.314 Instead, Alliance for Open Society neither relies on Leadership
Act funds for “continued survival”315 nor relies on the government as its
only source of funding.316 Because any recipient could realistically reject
these funds, Judge Straub found that the government did not “compel
anyone to speak the government’s favored viewpoint.”317 A number of
Second Circuit judges dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc with
the same criticism.318 These dissents suggest that an affirmative-negative
speech restriction is irrelevant to the unconstitutional conditions analysis.319
Similarly, Straub categorically objected to the majority’s reliance on
dicta from FAIR.320 Straub found that the dicta in FAIR only stated the
conclusion that there was no underlying First Amendment violation.321
Consequently, the Policy Requirement was not found to be coercive
because “[t]here is a basic difference between the denial of government
funding and a direct compulsion to speak.”322
After discarding that line of cases, Judge Straub presented two ways in
which a conditional subsidy could be unconstitutional: (1) the condition
operates as a “coercive penalty on the exercise of First Amendment rights”;
or (2) the condition operates to suppress a certain viewpoint.323 Based on
Regan, Straub observed that the court found that a conditional government
subsidy could be considered a coercive penalty on the exercise of First
Amendment rights if (1) the condition restricted the recipient’s speech
outside of the scope of the recipient’s participation in the government
313. See id. at 255–56; DKT Int’l, Inc., v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 762
n.2 (2007) (“Offering to fund organizations who agree with the government’s viewpoint and
will promote the government’s program is far removed from [Wooley and Barnette] in which
the government coerced its citizens into promoting its message on pain of losing their public
education . . . or access to public roads.”).
314. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 257.
315. See id.
316. While the exact percentage of Alliance for Open Society’s and Pathfinder’s total
funds derived from Agency grants is unclear, both certainly “receive funding from sources
other than the Agencies.” Id. at 224 (majority opinion).
317. See id. at 254 (Straub, J., dissenting).
318. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 678 F.3d 127 (2d
Cir. 2012) (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (noting that “the policy requirement does not actually
“mandate,” “compel,” or “require” the plaintiffs to say anything at all” (citing Alliance IV,
651 F.3d at 223, 228, 230 (majority opinion))).
319. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 256–57 (Straub, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 257–58; see FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)(“There is nothing in this case
approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse.”).
321. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 258 (finding that the Supreme Court in FAIR has found
that “a necessary but not sufficient element of an unconstitutional funding condition was
absent—there would be no underlying First Amendment violation if the condition was
applied directly”).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 246.
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program; or (2) the condition denied government benefits to which the
recipient would otherwise be entitled and that the government program at
issue did not provide.324 Either way, the denial of the government benefit
would infringe on the recipient’s freedom of speech.325
Additionally, Straub found that a funding condition only suppresses
certain viewpoints when the condition (1) aims to suppress dangerous ideas;
or (2) when the government creates a public forum designed to facilitate
private speech.326 He saw the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a twostep inquiry. First, the program must be deemed to create a public forum
that encourages a diversity of viewpoints.327 If the program does not create
a public forum, but instead uses private speakers to convey a government
message, then the government is allowed to ensure that its message is
neither “garbled or distorted”328 by restricting the viewpoints that can be
expressed by that private speaker, so long as it does not interfere with any
traditional relationships.329 If the program does establish a public forum,
then the government cannot violate its neutrality mandate without being
assessed under strict scrutiny and being presumed unconstitutional.330
2. Applying the Test: The Policy Requirement Does Not Impermissibly
Infringe on an NGO’s Free Speech
When Judge Straub applied his test, he found that the Leadership Act’s
Policy Requirement neither serves as a coercive penalty nor suppresses a
dangerous idea. This section details his finding that the Policy Requirement
does not act as a penalty and explains his conclusion that the Policy
Requirement does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
a. The Policy Requirement Does Not Act As a Coercive Penalty
First, Judge Straub concurred with the DKT International court that the
Policy Requirement did not restrict any recipient’s speech outside of the
scope of the program.331 He found that the organizational integrity
guidelines allowing for affiliate structures alleviate any concerns of
restricting speech outside of the program.332 An affiliate organization
324. See id. at 246–48 (“[T]here is no coercive force behind a funding condition that is
truly cabined to the federal subsidy program to which it is attached.”).
325. See FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006).
326. Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 261.
327. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text.
328. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
329. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1990); supra Part I.A.1.a.
330. See supra notes 67–71, 128, 143, 148–149 and accompanying notes.
331. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d at 259 (suggesting that any recipient is free to continue “to
remain silent or to espouse a pro-prostitution message with non-Leadership Act funds” by
creating an “affiliate organization to receive Leadership Act funds and comply with the
Leadership Act’s Policy Requirement”).
332. Id. at 262 (suggesting that the “organizational integrity guidelines” leave NGOs in
the same condition as previous to the regulation, with the ability to remain silent or speak a
pro-prostitution message).
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provides an adequate alternate route for expression and the ability to create
an affiliate organization provides the ability to engage in silence.333
Consequently, the Policy Requirement is not an impermissible restriction
preventing any adequate alternative “outlets” for expression; it is simply a
condition to accept or deny.334
Second, Judge Straub finds that the condition does not deny government
benefits to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled and that the
government program at issue did not provide.335 Thus, failing to comply
with the Policy Requirement does not threaten any independent existing
benefits.336
b. The Policy Requirement Does Not Suppress Any Viewpoint
Applying his test, Judge Straub finds that the Policy Requirement is
neither aimed at the dangerous suppression of ideas or in a governmentcreated public forum designed to facilitate private speech. Similar to the
D.C. Circuit, Judge Straub recognized that the Policy Requirement was not
intended to suppress the expression of NGOs desiring to remain silent or to
oppose the government’s message against prostitution and sex
trafficking.337 In fact, in neither case did the plaintiff argue that Congress
intended to do so.338 Judge Straub even points out that the effect of the law
would not be to suppress pro-prostitution views because public discourse
would hardly be altered by obligating a specific range of NGOs to espouse
the antiprostitution position.339 The Policy Requirement even supported the
reasonable goal of reducing a cause of the spread of HIV.340
Distinguishing Rosenberger, Judge Straub found that the Policy
Requirement had not meant to encourage private speech by NGOs.341
Consequently, the government was allowed to take certain measures to
ensure that its message was not weakened or diluted.342 Public forum
333. Id.
334. See id. at 259.
335. Id. at 258 (“The only consequence if Plaintiffs do not subscribe to the Leadership
Act’s Policy Requirement is that they will not receive Leadership Act funds.”).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 261 (finding that the purpose of the Policy Requirement was not to suppress
pro-prostitution views or even neutrality).
338. Id.
339. Id. (finding that Congress could not have intended to suppress public support for
prostitution with a conditional funding requirement to a narrow range of groups that wished
to combat HIV/AIDS).
340. Id. at 261–62 (“[T]he purpose and effects of the Policy Requirement are a far cry
from those cases where the government condition was clearly aimed at the suppression or
compulsion of speech qua speech.”).
341. Id. at 262 (finding that the purpose of the Leadership Act was not to fund a variety of
NGOs interested in espousing their viewpoint on prostitution and sex-trafficking but sought
“to advance an anti-prostitution, anti–sex trafficking approach to combating HIV/AIDS”
(citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601(23), 7611(a)(12) (2006))).
342. Id. at 263 (distinguishing the Velazquez cases because the government’s message
and strategy of combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic would be weakened and diluted if its
partners were allowed to speak in ways contrary to that message).
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principles were consequently inapplicable to the Policy Requirement
because “Congress did not authorize Leadership Act funds ‘in order to
create a public forum for [Plaintiffs] to express themselves.’”343
Foreign policy issues also weighed in favor of allowing the government
to make sure its message is not garbled. Judge Straub suggested that
because these polices are controversial and far-reaching, courts should defer
to Congress.344
Finally, Judge Straub categorically rejected the majority’s interpretation
that the purpose of the Leadership Act must be examined at the broadest
level of generality to see whether the viewpoint discrimination is a primary
or secondary component to the substantive goals of the program.345 The
viewpoint discrimination need not be a “central” component in order for it
to be permissible. Neither Rust nor Rosenberger nor Velazquez considered
the priority or weight of the potential purposes of the programs and Judge
Straub argued that the majority should not have considered them either.346
Like the DKT court, Straub found that the government interest in
eradicating HIV/AIDS was as important as its interest in ending prostitution
and sex trafficking.347 Judge Straub reasoned that the Policy Requirement
was substantially related to eradicating AIDS/HIV, prostitution, and sextrafficking because the policy is “precisely aimed at Congress’s goal.”348
Congress only authorized federal funds for organizations that shared its
desire to affirmatively reduce HIV/AIDS behavioral risks, including its
policy of eradicating prostitution.349 As a result, the Agencies require
recipients to affirm that they are in fact opposed to prostitution.350
The Policy Requirement addresses the interest by trying to regulate the
policies and practices of those using government funds; the Policy
Requirement is not “so attenuated . . . as to invalidate the condition.”351 As
agents for the government, the recipients are therefore required to adhere to
its policy.352 “[T]he Policy Requirement is obviously related to the

343. Id. (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194,
206 (2003)).
344. Id. at 265 (“[T]he decision whether to withhold Leadership Act funds from these
organizations or instead to provide an exemption from the Policy Requirement is precisely
the kind of policy judgment that Congress, not the courts, is entitled to make.”).
345. Id. at 265; see also id. at 238 (majority opinion) (finding that the main purpose was
based on eradicating HIV/AIDS, not prostitution and sex trafficking).
346. Id. at 266 (Straub, J., dissenting) (finding centrality of the viewpoint-discrimination
to the purpose not determinative).
347. Id. at 257.
348. Id at 265 (“[T]he Policy Requirement is obviously related to substantive policy goals
of the Leadership Act—goals beyond, and different from, simply subsidizing private speech
for its own sake.”).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 264.
352. Id.
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substantive policy goals of the Leadership Act—goals beyond, and different
from, simply subsidizing private speech for its own sake.”353
These government interests were still legitimate despite the exemptions
provided to certain organizations.354 Because organizations can be
exempted for a variety of legitimate reasons,355 the decision to exempt these
organizations is even stronger because it involved foreign affairs.356
III. HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER CANNOT ALWAYS CALL THE TUNE: THE
LEADERSHIP ACT’S POLICY REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE FOUND TO PLACE
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON RECIPIENT NGOS’ FREE SPEECH
Part III examines the conflict described in Part II and suggests that the
analysis should depend on whether the condition impermissibly coerces the
recipient or attempts to suppress a recipient’s unpopular idea. In doing so,
it asserts that Judge Straub of the Second Circuit pinpointed the appropriate
framework for analyzing conditional government subsidies but failed to
apply the test correctly. He provided two ways that a conditional subsidy is
unconstitutional: (1) the condition operates as a “coercive penalty on the
exercise of First Amendment rights” or (2) the condition operates to
suppress a certain viewpoint.357 This framework provides a clear, easy line
of analysis that would aid future courts in determining unconstitutional
conditions and should be adopted.
While this Note agrees with Judge Straub that the Policy Requirement
neither compels speech nor aims to suppress any recipients unpopular idea,
this Note contends that the Policy Requirement does not sufficiently limit
its scope to restrict only the recipient’s government-funded speech; instead
the Policy Requirement restricts both government-funded and privatelyfunded speech. As a result, the Policy Requirement acts as a coercive
penalty and ultimately fails heightened scrutiny.
A. Compelled Speech Is Not Relevant to the
Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis
While the Supreme Court has found that compelled speech is
impermissible under the First Amendment,358 speech is not compelled when
it is a condition for receiving a government subsidy.359 While perhaps
Wooley, Speiser, and Barnette aid the analysis by providing guidance in an

353. Id. at 265 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601(23), 7611(a)(12), (a)(12)(J) (2006 & Supp. V
2011)).
354. Id. at 265–66.
355. Id. at 266 (describing “diplomatic considerations” as the main legitimate reason for
exempting an organization). Congress’s desire to eradicate prostitution may also have been
an incentive to exempt the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative. Id. at 265.
356. Id. at 266.
357. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 46, 271 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
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area never dealt with before,360 it certainly seems strange to consider any
conditional relationship as truly compelled. Because the recipients are
never obligated to accept the conditions attached to federal funding, they
are free to choose alternate methods of funding besides Leadership Act
funds. Silence or neutrality can be, in fact, a viable option when speech is
conditional.361
B. The Policy Requirement Acts As a Coercive Penalty
At its core, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine defines the limits of
what society, and the law, deems coercive. Determining what is an act
compelled by force, however, is difficult to determine because many
pressures exist that influence one’s decision. Determining what analytical
baseline should be used to determine the limits of coercion can be
complicated as well.362 This is especially true when considering not
extreme cases, but moderate ones, such as conditional subsidies where the
government encourages speech in indirect ways.
The Court has found that an offer is not a threat if the recipient retains the
option to deny the funds altogether.363 While conditions may contain
underlying unconstitutional purposes or effects, conditional funds can never
be compelled in the same way that direct regulation can.364 Stopping the
analysis there, however, likely would only continue to frustrate the courts’
ability to provide a coherent framework of analysis.
Speiser and its progeny elaborate two ways in which the denial of a
government benefit can have the same effect as the direct regulation of
speech.365 As Judge Straub found, funding conditions are unconstitutional
if they operate as a coercive penalty on the exercise of First Amendment
rights when they either (1) restrict a recipient’s First Amendment speech
outside the scope of the recipient’s participation in a government program
or (2) deny benefits to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled and
that are independent from those provided by the government program at
issue.366
First, the Policy Requirement has prevented any recipient NGO from
expressing its silence or neutrality outside the scope of the government
program. While the Policy Requirement admittedly does not involve a
monopolistic use of power by the state in the same way that Wooley and
Barnette did,367 any recipient NGO is severely limited with what it can do
with any nonfederal private funds outside the scope of the program, to
360. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
361. But see supra note 272 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (holding that the condition still
allowed the recipients to accept or deny them and were therefore not deemed a penalty); see
also Part I.A.2.
364. See supra notes 22, 41, 109, 271–72 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 278–80 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 298–303 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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either remain neutral or speak a pro-prostitution message.368 The
Leadership Act funds are not tied to any particular project as was the case in
Rust or Regan, where each speaker could speak through alternate subsidiary
programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives
funding.369 Instead the Policy Requirement ties the funding to the grantee,
making a separation based on speech impossible because any grantee would
be unable to express a privately neutral or pro-prostitution message once it
has already spoken by adopting the Policy Requirement. Ultimately, the
Policy Requirement does leave each recipient in the same position as those
in Wooley and Barnette: without any reasonable alternative. Instead the
government could simply limit the Policy Requirement to the projects that
the government specifically funds, not to the grantee itself.
The Policy Requirement would also fail the second prong because the
condition denies recipient NGOs the ability to fund other pro-prostitution or
The affiliate
prostitution-neutral projects with nonfederal funds.370
organization structure does not solve that problem.371 As the majority
opinion in Alliance for Open Society indicates, affiliate structures are
inadequate to provide a sufficient outlet for any recipient to engage in
privately funded silence.372 The Policy Requirement’s affirmative speech
mandate becomes a penalty because it applies to the grantee rather than any
specific project that the grantee executes and provides an inadequate means
for separating that message independently through an affiliate dualstructure.373
The government’s failure to leave adequate alternative channels for
expression is especially notable when one considers the germaneness of the
Policy Requirement to the funding received. The Leadership Act authorizes
funding not for the purpose of eradicating prostitution or even espousing an
antiprostitution message; it authorizes funds for HIV/AIDS-, tuberculosis-,
and malaria-targeted work. While admittedly the targeted work can involve
prostitutes, the government has forced NGOs to respond to an issue that
these NGOs may never have intended to broach. The Policy Requirement
forces NGOs with no desire to work with prostitutes or sex-trafficking to
express a message where they would have otherwise remained neutral. The
government can ensure that its monies are tied to the message it wants to
espouse, but must require a sufficient nexus between the message and the
monies used.
Judge Straub argues that the previous cases turned only on whether the
government limited the scope of its funding to the purpose for which those
funds were authorized; none of those cases hinged on the affirmative versus
368. See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.
369. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991); see supra notes 104, 251–56 and
accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
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negative speech distinction.374 However, this criticism does not adequately
address the major difference between the Policy Requirement and previous
conditions. In Rust and Regan, negative speech requirements were central
aspects of the condition, and an affiliate organization would allow them to
speak differently on different projects. Here no such outlet is possible
because silence remains impossible once the speaker has spoken. Like the
Pied Piper who cannot unsing his tune, neither can the NGO disavow the
Policy Requirement once it has been declared. The condition obliging the
recipients to speak taints any speech made by any other affiliate
organization.
C. The Policy Requirement Does Not Suppress Any Viewpoint
Funding conditions that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint are only
subject to heightened scrutiny when they are (1) “aimed at the suppression
of dangerous ideas”375 or (2) when they are imposed in the context of a
program designed to encourage a diversity of views or facilitate private
speech.376 The Policy Requirement does not aim to suppress proprostitution or prostitution-neutral views from the marketplace of ideas.377
As Judge Straub acknowledges, Congress could hardly have thought to
suppress pro-prostitution views by limiting speech for NGOs seeking
funding for HIV/AIDS work. 378 If that were the case, the restriction would
hardly prevent the disfavored speech from being sung.
Nevertheless, the Court has not concluded that the condition need apply
to the general population at large. In Speiser v. Randall, for example, the
loyalty oath was not taken by anyone other than veterans eligible for a
property exemption.379 This condition did not necessarily suppress all
speech for those that wanted to advocate for the violent overthrow of the
government, but the condition was nevertheless found invalid because it
was found to significantly suppress an idea that was considered
dangerous—the violent overthrow of the government.380
While the Policy Requirement has not significantly suppressed the
speech of the general public because the public continues to be able to
discuss the issue freely and openly, the groups that are subject to the
condition are limited in what they can say. As illustrated by the
government’s findings which explicitly oppose pro-prostitution
viewpoints,381 the Policy Requirement arguably attempts to suppress the
“dangerous” idea of legalizing prostitution or even remaining neutral on the
374. See Alliance IV, 651 F.3d 218, 257 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., dissenting), reh’g en
banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012); Rust, 500 U.S. at 196, petition for cert. filed, No.
12-10 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
375. See supra notes 56, 114, 145 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 134–37, 148, 327 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
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issue. A narrow conception of the targeted group proves determinative
when considering whether a condition aims to suppress an idea. When
considered as the group of NGOs, the argument that the Policy
Requirement aims to suppress certain viewpoints becomes stronger; but
when considered from the standpoint of the public at large, and
understanding the limited nature of the speech, the Policy Requirement does
not aim to suppress a dangerous idea. The Policy Requirement aims only to
reduce a known cause of the HIV/AIDS epidemic: prostitution and sex
trafficking. 382
If the government could create a forum to encourage the diversity of
ideas,383 then the Policy Requirement similarly is not unconstitutional
because the government need not maintain its neutrality mandate.384 In
those situations where the government designed a program to use private
speakers to transmit its own government message, viewpoint discrimination
is not improper.385
The Policy Requirement does not encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers. The purpose of the Leadership Act, as defined by
Congress, was very narrow: to fund NGOs interested in fighting
HIV/AIDS through an antiprostitution, anti–sex trafficking approach.386
The government did not seek to establish a fund to encourage a diversity of
viewpoints about prostitution or sex trafficking.
As with all policy decisions, Congress made a viewpoint-based decision
that allocated public resources for fighting HIV/AIDS. The Leadership
Act’s funded programs are distinguishable from Rosenberger and Finley,387
where the programs were designed to encourage a diversity of ideas, as well
as Velazquez, where the program was designed to facilitate private
speech.388 Here the purpose of the Leadership Act is to combat HIV/AIDS
in a particular manner. It makes no difference that the eradication of sex
trafficking and prostitution is supplementary to the main goal of the
Leadership Act. However counterproductive or ineffectual the policy
decision may be towards achieving the end result of reducing the
HIV/AIDS epidemic,389 Congress made a policy choice to espouse an
antiprostitution, anti–sex trafficking message and is entitled to make sure
that its message is neither “garbled nor distorted.”390
This is not, however, an example of the government retroactively
recasting the Leadership Act’s purpose as one of conveying a message
against prostitution simply because that would conveniently allow the
government to compel recipients to affirmatively espouse its point of
382.
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384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–37, 148, 327 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128, 330 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
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view.391 Instead the Policy Requirement closely relates to the policy goals
of the Leadership Act, beyond subsidizing the private speech for its own
sake.392 The prostitution and sex trafficking concerns are not simply
redefined after the fact, but were originally included in the findings and
purpose of the statute itself.393
The exceptions given to certain organizations do not seem particularly
troubling either.394 Congress is allowed to exempt organizations that would
neither garble nor distort the strong antiprostitution message that the U.S.
government sought to advance, even though that may be the practical effect
of those exemptions. A host of political factors could lead to these
conclusions, including the diplomatic relations between countries and
institutions upon which the U.S government relies.395 The U.S. diplomatic
relationship with the United Nations could easily explain why the Act
exempts all U.N. agencies, for example.
The judiciary should show deference when it comes to issues of foreign
affairs.396 The executive and Congress have historically been afforded a
great deal of deference and duly so.397 Because foreign affairs “uniquely
demand [a] single-voiced statement of the Government’s views,”398 the
Leadership Act should only be considered a policy choice, which advocates
a certain strategy at the expense of another but does not intend to suppress a
dangerous idea on the marketplace or suppress the viewpoints of certain
speakers once in a government-created public forum.399
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the framework of analysis espoused by Judge Straub
to assess the constitutionality of government subsidies affecting free
speech. This Note supports the framework he proposed, which asks
whether a conditional subsidy suppresses a certain viewpoint or acts as a
coercive penalty on speech. A condition acts as a penalty by either
restricting speech outside of the scope of the government program or
denying a benefit to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled.
Alternatively, when the condition aims not to define the limits of federal
spending, but to suppress certain viewpoints, the condition is
unconstitutional.
The application of this analysis to the Leadership Act supports
concluding that the Policy Requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a
recipient’s freedom of speech, preventing recipient NGOs from playing
391.
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394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See supra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253–355 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253–355 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230–340 and accompanying text.
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their own pro-prostitution or prostitution-neutral tunes. Because the
government has an important interest in maintaining a unified message on
foreign affairs and has determined that prostitution causes the spread of
HIV/AIDS, the Policy Requirement cannot be considered compelled speech
or viewpoint suppression. However, the Policy Requirement prevents a
recipient from engaging in privately funded silence or neutrality, chills best
practices for combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and could be achieved
through a less restrictive alternative. Consequently, because an HIV/AIDS
NGO should be free to play its own tune with nonfederal funds, the Policy
Requirement should be deemed an unconstitutional condition.

